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Executive Summary
Cooperation and competition among regional
financial arrangements (RFAs) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) increasingly determine the
effectiveness of the global financial safety net
(GFSN), which many observers fear is becoming
fragmented. Overlap among these crisis-fighting
institutions has important benefits but also
pitfalls, including with respect to competition,
moral hazard, independence, institutional conflict,
creditor seniority and non-transparency. The study
reviews the RFAs in Latin America, East Asia and
Europe to assess their relationships with the IMF
and address these problems. Among other things, it
concludes: institutional competition, while harmful
in program conditionality, can be beneficial in
economic analysis and surveillance; moral hazard
depends critically on institutional governance and
varies substantially from one regional arrangement
to the next; secretariats should be independent
in economic analysis, but lending programs
should be decided by bodies with political
responsibility; and conflicts among institutions
are often resolved by key member states through
informal mechanisms that should be protected
and developed. Findings of other recent studies
on the GFSN are critiqued. Architects of financial
governance should maintain the IMF at the
centre of the safety net but also develop regional
arrangements as insurance against the possibility
that any one institution could be immobilized
in a crisis, thereby safeguarding both coherence
and resilience of the institutional complex.

Introduction
Global financial governance confronts challenges
that are perhaps more severe than any it has
faced since the founding of the Bretton Woods
institutions 75 years ago. Nationalist political
movements threaten the commitment of several
advanced and emerging-market countries to
global multilateral institutions, while at the
same time the proliferation of institutions has
made their coordination substantially more
complicated. When the global economic cycle
begins a downturn, any weakening of international
financial institutions or the arrangements by

which they cooperate would impair the ability
of the system as a whole to combat crises and
stabilize the world economy. It is important to
ensure that these institutions are not only healthy,
but also equipped to cooperate effectively with
one another to deliver financial assistance.
The administration of US President Donald Trump
has for the time being blocked the IMF, which has
historically been at the centre of global financial
governance, from receiving a quota increase (US
Treasury 2018). Member governments that wish
to support the multilateral institution will instead
renew the arrangements by which the IMF can
borrow from its members. Quotas are not being
reweighted in favour of emerging market and
developing countries (EMDCs) during the fifteenth
review, perpetuating under-representation of fastgrowing members. With the recent appointment of
another American as president of the World Bank
and a European as managing director of the IMF,
the abandonment of the convention by which US
and European citizens lead these institutions in
favour of well-qualified officials from other parts
of the world appears to be a receding prospect.
Many EMDCs have hedged against resistance to
modernizing global financial governance on the part
of the United States and some European countries
by developing alternatives to the IMF over the last
two decades. These countries have accumulated
international reserves unilaterally, entered into
currency swap agreements bilaterally and created
financial arrangements regionally and crossregionally. For their part, euro-area member states
created new facilities for financial assistance during
the European debt crisis of 2010–2013. Together
with the IMF, these financial facilities comprise
an international regime complex1 for crisis finance
that, in the discourse on financial governance,
is often called the global financial safety net.
One important question at this juncture is
how EMDCs and euro-area member states will
develop and use the new institutional options
now at their disposal. These countries have by
no means abandoned the IMF; they continue to
support and draw from that global multilateral
institution. However, if the United States and
other leading member states refuse to update the

1

The growing international relations literature on regime complexity
includes, but is not limited to, Alter and Raustiala (2018); Morse and
Keohane (2014); Abbott, Green and Keohane (2016); Lipscy (2017); and
Henning and Pratt (2019).
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Fund and augment its resources, these countries
will have strong incentives to further build up
alternative institutions, including their RFAs.
The pattern raises the prospect that someday the
functional equivalent of the IMF might be created
within each region — an “Asian Monetary Fund,”
a “European Monetary Fund,” a “Latin American
Monetary Fund” and so forth. Proposals for such
funds have been advanced in each of these three
regions. A “world of regional monetary funds”
would challenge the IMF, if not substantially
displace it from its position at the centre of the
safety net. Such a world might in fact be unlikely,
but the quest to diversify the financial safety
net will endure and extend to the development
of central bank swaps and other facilities.
Proliferation of these financial arrangements and
institutions substantially increases the complexity
of the financial safety net. Such complexity has
a number of benefits — it augments the total
resources that can be brought to bear on a crisis
and protects the ability of the system as a whole
to respond to crises against the capture (or
starvation) of any one of its parts by a narrowly
self-serving government. Redundant layers of
the safety net serve as insurance against the
immobilization of any one layer. But, considerable
though such advantages might be, complexity
is ultimately beneficial only if the different
elements are effectively coordinated and thus do
not interfere with one another in a crisis. Such
coordination cannot be taken for granted —
especially when member states that stand behind
the institutions are embroiled in disputes over
trade, immigration or security as they are now.
This special report addresses the problem of
coordinating the RFAs and the IMF. The next
section reviews recent debates over global
financial governance and its reform, including the
reports of several blue-ribbon commissions and
official working groups. The third section then
enumerates the general risks and promises of
institutional overlap and complexity, setting the
stage for dissecting specific threats in subsequent
sections. The fourth section reviews recent
developments in the RFAs in Latin America,
East Asia and the euro area, including their
present challenges and recommendations for
strengthening them. The fifth section addresses
the recent evolution of the IMF insofar as it
relates to engagement with the RFAs. This section
forgoes extended discussion of the history of the

2
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development of the RFAs, the IMF and the rest
of the GFSN, as these can be found elsewhere.2
In the sixth section, the report assesses the dangers
posed by the overlap of crisis-fighting institutions
and recommends strategies for pre-empting or
managing them. It addresses many questions, for
example: Should institutions always cooperate or
are there areas where it is safe, even beneficial,
to allow them to compete? Does a multiplicity of
institutions in crisis finance increase the threat
of moral hazard? Does it make crisis finance more
susceptible to capture by banks and other privatesector institutions? How should conflicts among
institutions be resolved? Which institutions should
have seniority as creditors in a complex such as
the GFSN? The final section concludes the report.
A substantial portion of scholarship on RFAs
is motivated by the question of whether they
should be promoted as counterweights to the
IMF or discouraged on the reasoning that they
compete with, and complicate the work of, the IMF.
Whether an RFA or the IMF is the better vehicle
for a financial rescue program for a crisis-stricken
country, or whether the two institutions would
best cooperate in administering such a program,
depends on several prior questions, however.
General statements about the superiority of one
approach over the other in providing financial
stability, the ultimate purpose of the safety net,
are not defensible. Rather than advocating for
either RFAs or the IMF, therefore, the present
report examines factors that illuminate the
strengths and weaknesses of each and the
pathways toward cooperation. RFAs and the
IMF are, in principle, complementary. But
complementarity does not evolve automatically
— it must be actively designed into the
institutions as they evolve within the complex.
The present study is distinguished from the recent
reports in four respects. First, while it discusses
the strategic choices facing each of the RFAs
in their regional context, the study focuses on
the interaction between each of them and the
incumbent global multilateral institution, the
IMF. Second, this study has the luxury of being
more explicit about the political economy of
financial cooperation — both in the region and
within the global multilateral institution — than
some of the official reports and economic studies.

2

See the scholarship cited in the following section.

Third, while the study identifies ways to advance
the substantive effectiveness of institutional
cooperation, it recognizes that states seek other
goals as well, among which control is especially
important, and bring institutions together to
constrain “agency drift.” Finally, and relatedly, the
report emphasizes the need for recommendations
that are not only desirable from a technocratic
point of view, but also feasible from a political
economy standpoint, given the intergovernmental
character of the institutions for crisis finance.

Debate over Financial
Governance
Concern over the coherence of financial governance
has spawned a cottage industry of blue-ribbon
panels and expert studies over the future of these
institutions and how they should be “knitted”
together. These include studies by the IMF and
RFAs themselves, as well as the European Central
Bank (ECB) and independent scholars.3 This
section summarizes the findings of several of these
studies and elaborates on the distinction between
technocratic and political-economy prescription.

Reports and Perspectives
Building on guidelines developed within the
Group of Twenty (G20), the IMF offers six
principles to guide its relationships with regional
arrangements (see Boxes 1 and 2). The first of
these is that mutual engagement must respect
the independence of the institutions from one
another. The other five principles state that
institutional mandates and expertise should guide
institutions’ roles in cooperation; collaboration
should be ongoing; program terms and conditions
should be consistent from the borrower’s
standpoint; the Fund’s engagement should be
even-handed across the regions; and the IMF’s
preferred creditor status must be respected.

3

In addition to the work cited below, see Miyoshi et al. (2013); Rhee,
Sumulong and Vallé (2013); Eichengreen (2012); Ocampo (2017);
Grabel (2017); Henning (2017); Eichengreen, Lombardi and Malkin
(2018); Triggs (2018); Kring and Grimes (2019); and Malone and
Medhora (2019).

The IMF also lays out two overall visions by which
it would collaborate with RFAs in the future — the
“lead agency” model and the “coherent program
design” model. The choice of the model would
depend on the characteristics and capabilities
of the RFA and the possibilities for a reasonably
clear division of labour. Where “some division of
labour” between the IMF and the RFA is possible,
the two institutions would defer to one another in
their respective areas of comparative advantage
when designing and implementing programs.
Where the overlaps between the capabilities and
mandates of the two institutions are so large as to
make selective deference infeasible, the coherentdesign model would apply. The latter would see
early engagement between the institutions, and
the Fund would adhere to its macroeconomic
framework and debt sustainability analysis (DSA)
(IMF 2017a, 2, 17, 22, 25). Authors from the RFAs
call for clarification of the modalities, division of
labour and combined use of lending instruments
(Cheng et al. 2018, 16–18). However, it would be
fair to surmise that the IMF expects to follow the
coherent-design model in European contingencies
and to serve as the lead agency everywhere else.
The G20 convened an Eminent Persons Group
(EPG) on Global Financial Governance under the
leadership of Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister
Tharman Shanmugaratnam, and it delivered
its report, Making the Global Financial System
Work for All, in October 2018.4 Calling generally
for cooperation, the EPG report advocated
strengthening the coordination of multilateral
development institutions; facilitating countries’
openness to international capital markets; and
integrating the surveillance activities of the IMF,
the Financial Stability Board and the Bank for
International Settlements. With respect to the IMF
and RFAs specifically, the report recommended
establishing a “clear assignment of responsibilities
and protocols for joint actions,” which would
include “discussions of coherence of ex-post
conditionality” and liquidity needs. The group
wanted to keep alive proposals for an IMF liquidity
facility, which could be coordinated with similar
facilities offered by the RFAs. The EPG recommends
that the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, the World
Bank and other multilateral development banks be
amended to delegate greater decision making —
presumably with respect to design and approval

4

Hereafter referred to as the “G20 EPG Report,” or simply “EPG Report.”
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Box 1: G20 Principles for Cooperation between the IMF and Regional Financing
Arrangements
In November 2010, G20 Leaders tasked G20
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to
explore “ways to improve collaboration between
RFAs and the IMF across all possible areas.” Based
on contributions by the EU and by ASEAN+3
countries members of the G20, the following
non-binding broad principles for cooperation
have been agreed. Also, collaboration with the
IMF should be tailored to each RFA in a flexible
manner in order to take account of region-specific
circumstances and the characteristics of RFAs.
Principle 1: An enhanced cooperation between
RFAs and the IMF would be a step forward
towards better crisis prevention, more effective
crisis resolution and would reduce moral hazard.
Cooperation between RFAs and the IMF should
foster rigorous and even-handed surveillance
and promote the common goals of regional
and global financial and monetary stability.
Principle 2: Cooperation should respect the
roles, independence and decision-making
processes of each institution, taking into account
regional specificities in a flexible manner.
Principle 3: While cooperation between RFAs
and the IMF may be triggered by a crisis, ongoing
collaboration should be promoted as a way to
build regional capacity for crisis prevention.

of programs and projects — to the management
of each institution (G20 EPG 2018, 1–27).
José de Gregorio et al. (2018) address the
relationship of the IMF to RFAs in the context of
an ambitious report, IMF Reform: The Unfinished
Agenda.5 They propose that the IMF “negotiate
formal agreements with current and future RFAs
and consider a binding arbitration procedure to
resolve disagreements” (ibid., 53–55). The authors
advocate that the IMF create a fast-qualifying,
non-conditional facility that would effectively
substitute for bilateral swap agreements (BSAs).
They also propose to reorganize the governance of
the IMF along the lines of an independent central

5
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Hereafter referred to as the “Geneva Report” for the series in which it
appears.
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Principle 4: Cooperation should commence as
early as possible and include open sharing of
information and joint missions where necessary.
It is clear that each institution has comparative
advantages and would benefit from the expertise
of the other. Specifically, RFAs have better
understanding of regional circumstances and the
IMF has a greater global surveillance capacity.
Principle 5: Consistency of lending conditions
should be sought to the extent possible, in
order to prevent arbitrage and facility shopping,
in particular as concerns policy conditions
and facility pricing. However, some flexibility
would be needed as regards adjustments to
conditionality, if necessary, and on the timing
of the reviews. In addition, definitive decisions
about financial assistance within a joint
programme should be taken by the respective
institutions participating in the programme.
Principle 6: RFAs must respect the
preferred creditor status of the IMF.
Source: G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors (2011).
Note: The ASEAN + 3 consists of the 10 Southeast Asian
countries of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) plus China, Japan and South Korea.

bank, wherein the management team would make
decisions and take responsibility for program
design and disbursements. The management team
would be selected by a new voting procedure
and accountable to an executive board that could
be made non-resident and convene six to eight
times a year (ibid., xx–xxiii, 72-73). The authors
base their argument for independence on the
IMF’s susceptibility to time inconsistency: it might
declare ex ante that it will not lend to countries
whose debt is not sustainable, such as Greece,
but in the event will nevertheless succumb
to pressure to lend from countries that would
otherwise suffer from a debt restructuring.
By contrast, the Independent Evaluation Office
(IEO) of the IMF expressed concern that distancing
program approval and lending decisions from

Box 2: The IMF’s Six Principles for Strengthening IMF-RFA Collaboration
Principle 1: Independence. The modalities of
engagement should respect the independence
of the Fund and the RFA. Decisions by the
Fund and the RFA must comply with their
own policies and governance structures.
Principle 2: Mandates and technical
expertise. The roles played by each institution
in any particular form of engagement (e.g.,
surveillance, lending) should reflect their
respective mandates and purpose (e.g., in a
Use of Fund Resources context, the Fund’s
focus is on resolving short- to medium-term
BoP [balance of payment] needs), technical
expertise, comparative advantage, legal
and governance structures, and constraints
imposed by any regional legal frameworks
(e.g., treaty obligations in the EU).
Principle 3: Early and ongoing cooperation.
The Fund and RFAs should strive to
collaborate on an ongoing basis — to
strengthen the capacity for crisis prevention
— and work together efficiently and
quickly when a financing need arises.
Principle 4: Consistency and limited
arbitrage. Collaboration in lending for the Fund
requires consistency — in the sense of a single
program, belonging to the member country,
which may be supported by multiple creditors.

national governments would weaken the Fund’s
accountability and legitimacy, not strengthen them
(IEO 2018). The EPG, for its part, takes a nuanced
view on governance within the international
financial institutions. The executive boards should
focus on strategic priorities for the institution and
hold management to account for advancing them,
although IMF “surveillance and lending programs
may involve broader considerations that require
Board discussion” (G20 EPG 2018, 73–75, footnote
83, as discussed below). Such reforms impact
the ability of the IMF to collaborate with RFAs.
Meanwhile, Beatrice Weder di Mauro and
Jeromin Zettelmeyer (2017) raise the alarm
against moral hazard when the IMF and RFAs are
brought together. They argue that the IMF failed
to anchor the European Stability Mechanism

To reduce incentives for facility shopping, the
modalities and policies relating to program
conditionality and monitoring should be
transparent and predictable, and explicit links
to Fund support should be considered for
high levels of RFA financing. Finally, public
communications by the Fund and the RFA
should be coordinated and consistent.
Principle 5: Evenhandedness. The
Fund’s engagement with RFAs should be
evenhanded across RFAs and between
RFA members and other Fund members.
This principle of evenhandedness would
in practice apply by “activity” and hence
(since the scope of activities differs
across RFAs) it does not necessarily imply
identical treatment for each RFA.
Principle 6: Fund’s preferred creditor
status. Preferred creditor status reflects an
international consensus (originating in the
Paris Club) that the Fund is excluded from
debt restructuring processes. This must be
maintained, as it is derived from the IMF’s
unique role within the GFSN. Moreover,
even if the Fund is invited to contribute
to a program, the Fund’s participation is
ultimately an issue for the Fund to decide.
Source: IMF (2017f).

(ESM) against drift toward “soft financing” in the
case of Greece and advocate that RFAs develop
their own policy frameworks with safeguards
against lending to countries with unsustainable
debt. Authors located at the ECB raise similar
concerns (see, for example, Scheubel and
Stracca 2016; ECB 2016; International Relations
Committee Taskforce on IMF Issues 20186).

6

Hereafter referred to as the “IRC Taskforce.”
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Technocratic versus
Political Prescription
Most of the reports on global financial governance,
including the Geneva and G20 EPG reports, are
guided by an approach that is technocratic,
seeking to advance financial stability and the
economic welfare of the global system. Normatively
speaking, they resist the constraints that are
imposed on institutional design and interaction
by virtue of the intergovernmental nature of
these organizations. Revealingly, the EPG Report
states, “Policy thinking on the issue has often
been shaped by whether one sits in [capital]
sending or receiving countries. We have to move
beyond this” (G20 EPG 2018; emphasis added).
If the resources for crisis finance were to come
from non-state actors, global governance might
indeed “move beyond this.” But that is not realistic
over the relevant planning horizon. For the time
being, the relationships among the IMF and RFAs
must be designed with the understanding that
national finance ministries and central banks will
insist on control over the institutions — that is,
within an intergovernmental paradigm. Rather
than ask creditors and debtors to put aside their
financial status, architects of governance must
search for institutional pathways along which
they can cooperate that are consistent with these
interests — a pathway that might be narrow but,
insofar as states’ interests do overlap, can be found.
Moreover, it is dangerous for architects of global
financial governance to feign innocence of or
otherwise ignore institutional politics. This is
one of the greatest lessons of the euro crisis
of 2010–2013. In Europe, monetary integration
had gotten out in front of political integration,
creating severe vulnerabilities. While it is possible
to envision a more complete monetary union,
one in which risk is better shared across the
membership, this would require deep changes in
euro-area governance. If governance does not catch
up — and this remains to be seen — monetary
integration could be endangered once again.
Fundamentally, international financial institutions
are created and maintained by and responsible
to their member states. For various reasons,
however, institutions often migrate away from the
preferences of powerful states, a tendency called
“agency drift.” The euro crisis shows that states can
use one institution to correct such drift and reassert
control over other institutions (Henning 2017;

6
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2019). Involving multiple institutions in financial
rescues, as in the case of the “troika,” can give rise
to disputes that can be costly, but states prioritize
control instead. When institutional disagreements
become intense and create deadlock, key states,
usually creditors, often mediate these disputes. In
so doing, they put their thumb on the scale and tilt
the outcome toward their preferences. Mediation
is thus one way in which key states maintain
control. States are reluctant to disintermediate
themselves and, as a consequence, they underinvest
in mechanisms that might otherwise better
anticipate and resolve institutional conflict ex ante.
As a result, mechanisms of ex ante coordination
of intergovernmental institutions are rarely,
perhaps never, going to fully satisfy architects
who take a functionalist approach to the design
of complexes of institutions. When designing
institutions and the relationships among them,
architects of the safety net should identify what
is both desirable and feasible — not simply
one or the other — and they should act at the
intersection of the two approaches, rationaltechnocratic and political-institutional.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that, although
states in some emerging regions of the world
originally created financial arrangements to bypass
or constrain the IMF, the RFAs themselves are not
immune to agency drift. So, the pivotal states in
each region might use the IMF to constrain drift
on the part of an RFA, rather than necessarily vice
versa — as witnessed during the euro crisis.

General Risks and
Promises of Institutional
Overlap
To analyze the problems of overlapping jurisdiction
of international institutions in crisis finance, this
section considers the comparative advantages
of global multilateralism and regionalism and
then examines issues that can arise in their
interaction. Its treatment is general, a prelude
to examining the evolution of the three RFAs
and the IMF in the two sections that follow.

Comparative Advantages
Global multilateralism in finance has the advantage,
first, of drawing upon a universal risk pool. This is
fundamentally important not only because such a
pool can be large, but also because it is universal.
Universalism ensures that financial outflows from
a country experiencing a crisis are balanced by
inflows to other countries in the same pool. Most
of these capital flows move through the private
sector and must be captured by the public sector in
order to provide official assistance, which can be a
formidable problem. But, when the private-public
gap can be bridged, capital flows can be balanced
within the pool, whereas they can escape systems
that have only partial geographic coverage. A global
institution, to put it another way, corresponds
to the globalized nature of financial markets.
A global multilateral institution also comprehends
the broadest possible range of country
experience and problems, can derive lessons
from this experience and can apply them to
surveillance and new country programs. It can,
in principle, maximize economies of scale in staff
organization and economies of agglomeration
across substantive areas of expertise. Finally,
as a universal risk pool, the global institution
might well be called upon to back up regional
and other financial facilities and is, in this sense,
a last resort, which has implications for the
appropriate location of preferred creditor status.
The functional case for regionalism rests on
the depth of economic integration at the
regional level relative to the global level and
the regional character of financial contagion.
Economic and financial shocks propagate more
readily among countries with deeper trade
and financial connections, which coincide
frequently, although not always, with spatial
proximity. Under these circumstances, geographic
neighbours have a stronger incentive than distant
partners to invest in financial rescue facilities
on a regional basis and maintain them. The
regional character of crises is accentuated by
spillover across functional areas, to trade, social
conditions, foreign policy and regional politics.
Regional secretariats generally, although not
necessarily always, have better local knowledge.
In matters of surveillance, for example, they
might have a better sense of "where the bodies
are buried,” where the vulnerabilities might be
and what the domestic political obstacles may

be to overcoming them. Coming from within the
region, officials might have greater legitimacy
in dealing with member countries. Regional
institutions that are relatively young do not carry
the burden of a history of crisis interventions, or
of the mistakes that might have been made along
the way and the stigma associated with them.
However, regional arrangements have the
relative disadvantage of a risk pool that is both
narrower and less diversified than that of a global
institution. Just as an insurance company would
be ill advised to sell policies against hurricane
damage only in the US state of Florida, regional
arrangements alone are not likely to be effective
insurance against financial crises that consume
whole regions. Crises over the last few decades
have exhibited a strong regional dimension,
which is why most of them are referred to by their
regional names — the “Asian financial crisis,” the
“European sovereign debt crisis” and so forth. So,
while regional integration motivates the creation of
RFAs, it can also motivate regions’ links to the IMF.

Risks
Layering RFAs, the IMF and other elements of
the financial safety net on top of one another
gives rise to a number of potential problems.
The first problem is conceptually straightforward:
the financial safety net covers some countries
better than others. Nearly all countries are
members of the IMF and can draw on it in cases
of need. But IMF resources alone might not be
sufficient to stabilize a liquidity shock that is
systemic in nature, and the coverage of RFAs is
incomplete. Many countries are not members of
a regional arrangement, and some of those that
are have access that is uncertain.7 Some countries
get too little coverage, prompting them to selfinsure with unilateral reserve accumulation
excessively; other countries, by contrast, could
at least in principle be receiving too much
coverage, undercutting incentives to control risk.
Second, there is thus the possibility that complexity
contributes to moral hazard, of which we can
distinguish two types, private sector and official
sector moral hazard. With the thickening of
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See, for example, IMF (2017a), Sterland (2017a) and Triggs (2018).
Adam Triggs analyzes the size of the safety net on a country-specific
basis and surveys policy makers’ views.
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the safety net,8 private financial institutions
could well lend and borrow in the expectation
that the prospects for financial rescues by the
official institutions have risen. If one institution
is blocked, for one reason or another, crisis
lending could be mobilized through an alternative
channel. In this way, the proliferation of official
institutions and facilities could stoke excessive
private lending, excessive debt issuance and,
eventually, larger crises. A similar argument
could be made for official-sector moral hazard.
Third, complexity gives rise to multiple avenues
for private capture of official institutions and
the processes by which decisions on financial
assistance are made.9 Private creditors are
sometimes well placed to cajole, influence or
threaten officials in order to manipulate the
complex of institutions to their advantage —
by, among other means, holding “innocent
bystanders” hostage for bailouts. We should be
alert to the possibility that, as one institution
erects safeguards against abuse (such as the
IMF’s lending framework and reprofiling
requirements), lenders who have been imprudent
(either private or official) simply exploit other
institutions in the safety net. We should be sure,
in other words, that redundancy in the safety
net is not being used to “bypass” safeguards
against private capture and moral hazard.
Fourth, with a larger number of potential sources
of crisis finance, borrowers are more likely to
shop around. Pakistan, for example, reportedly
approached Saudi Arabia, China and the United
Arab Emirates before finally turning to the IMF
in October 2018 to negotiate a program. Creditor
shopping has at least two potentially negative
consequences: it delays the program and thus
financing and adjustment; and it could possibly
weaken the conditions attached to programs.
Such a weakening might be perceived to be
beneficial, if IMF conditionality were excessively
austere. In such case, augmenting IMF resources
with bilateral or regional resources could
be an appropriate complement to a more
permissive adjustment path. But a weakening of
conditions would not be beneficial if alternative

8

8

Conventionally, the GFSN has four main components: the IMF, RFAs,
BSAs and international reserves held unilaterally.
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This is related to, but conceptually different from, moral hazard. Capture
can, in principle, occur even when excessive risk taking is not involved.
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creditors stepped forward with poorly designed
programs or if competition between elements
of the safety net caused institutional officials
to weaken the coherence of their program.
Fifth, the IMF wishes to guard against what could
be called a “nightmare scenario.” In this scenario, a
bilateral creditor or an RFA disburses to a borrower
under stress with the understanding that the
country faces a liquidity crisis, but mistakenly
so. By the time that the creditor realizes the true
extent of the need for fundamental adjustment,
the crisis has deepened and metastasized to
regional neighbours. The original borrower,
and perhaps now other countries in the region,
only then turns to the IMF for financing — by
which time the scale of the adjustment problem
has magnified, the options for dealing with it
have narrowed and the costs have soared.
Again, there is a possibility that the IMF itself
could also fail to correctly diagnose a problem
of liquidity or fundamental adjustment, or fail
to stem contagion to a borrower’s regional
neighbours. A number of analysts argue that the
IMF contributed to contagion in East Asia in 19971998 by underfunding programs and exacting
excessive adjustment and currency depreciation
(see, for example, Ito 2007; 2012; 2018). This line
of argument leads to the debate over which
institution delivers the most appropriate diagnosis
and can design the better adjustment program,
the IMF or the regional arrangement. Such a
debate cannot be settled in the abstract. Suffice it
to say for the moment that, in principle, member
states have the right to create RFAs but that, as a
practical matter, the IMF possesses an analytical
capacity and breadth and depth of experience with
such programs that is currently unparalleled.

Promises
Having multiple institutions operating in the
financial crisis space has benefits as well as dangers.
Complexity provides redundancy, which is
especially useful when, for one reason or another,
one institution is immobilized. Institutional
partners bring additional resources to bear in
financial rescues, both staff expertise and financial
resources. Resource augmentation is especially
important when those of the IMF could be declining
yet financial markets remain globalized and capitalaccount crises prevail. A multiplicity of institutions
introduces alternative diagnoses and prescriptions
for economic problems. Although competition over

the terms of lending and policy conditionality in
programs would be destructive, competition in
analysis, forecasting and surveillance can benefit
member states and improve economic outcomes.
To realize such benefits, and to avoid the pitfalls,
however, institutions must be coordinated and
competition constrained in activities where it
is dysfunctional. As the institutions evolve over
time, moreover, their interactions with others
in the institutional complex for crisis finance
must be anticipated. Rather than undergo
reform as if they operate in isolation and later
be thrown together to address crises, these
institutions should be guided in their evolution
by a design concept for the complex as a whole.
Reasonable success in coordinating most
institutions in most crises has fed complacency
with respect to organizing relations among the
international financial institutions (IFIs). One
might take the view that, although the institutions
have conflicts, they can be made to work together
effectively in the future. But the reason why
institutional cooperation could be organized
reasonably satisfactorily in the (increasingly
distant) past is that the IMF was heavily influential,
if not dominant, and, when it shared authority with
European institutions in the euro crisis, leading
member states were in a position to arbitrate
conflicts among the institutions. Both of these
conditions appear to be changing, and so renewed
attention to the collaboration mechanisms of the
Fund and regional arrangements is required.

Regions and Their
Financial Arrangements
RFAs have emerged in most, but not all, regions
of the world. The IMF (2017a, 6) defines them
simply as “a financing mechanism backed by
pooled resources through which a group of
countries pledge common financial support to a
fellow member in the event of external liquidity

needs or balance of payments difficulties.”10
Table 1 lists 11 institutions that qualify as RFAs.
Notice, first, that they are quite heterogeneous:
some have a mandate and the capacity for
economic surveillance and analysis, but
others do not. Some RFAs have mandates
for economic integration of the region and
economic development. The ESM, with a
lending capacity of €500 billion, is very large,
while others can mobilize only a few billion US
dollars. The heterogeneity of RFAs complicates
efforts to develop general protocols for other
institutions’ engagement with them.
From among this set, the present section selects
three arrangements for deeper consideration, those
in Latin America, East Asia and Europe. The group
encompasses substantial regional variation and
ranges from small to large institutions, and thus
captures most, if not all, of the major problems
that are likely to arise in cooperation with the
IMF. Although the European arrangements are
embedded within a monetary union, which
creates some unique features, the euro-area
institutions nonetheless share challenges that
are enough in common with those of the other
RFAs to consider them together. The section
emphasizes relatively recent development of these
RFAs, the strategic questions confronting them
and their evolving relationships to the IMF.11

Latin America
The region’s financial arrangement is the Latin
American Reserve Fund. The central banks of
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela
first created the Andean Reserve Fund in 1978 as
a regional project that also included the creation
of the Andean Development Corporation in
1970. In 1989, with the objective of expanding
membership beyond the Andean region to the
rest of Latin America, the members renamed the
organization the Latin American Reserve Fund
(FLAR, the acronym of the Spanish name).12 Costa

10 The RFA authors adopt a somewhat different definition: “a crisis
prevention or resolution mechanism for a defined region or a group of
countries sharing similar economic characteristics (for example, BRICS
[Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa]) and mandated to provide
emergency liquidity to its member countries” (Cheng et al. 2018, 5-6).
11 More historical accounts and elaborate description of the RFAs can be
found, for example, in IMF (2017b), Cheng et al. (2018) and Miyoshi et
al. (2013).
12 See Haggard (2013), Perry (2013), Grabel (2017) and Kring and Grimes
(2019).
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Table 1: RFAs and Their Relationship to the IMF
Name

10

Eligible Members

Purpose

Size

Nature of Link
to IMF

EU Macro-Financial EU candidate,
Assistance Facility neighbouring
and third
countries

To provide mediumand long-term
financial assistance to
address balance-ofpayments difficulties

€2.0 billiona

Formally linked

EU Balance of
Payments Facilityb

To provide medium-term
financial assistance

€50 billion

Not formally
linked to IMF
programs but
linked as a matter
of practice in
recent cases;
members obliged
to consult
European
Union before
approaching IMF

European Financial All EU members
Stabilisation
Mechanism

To address severe
disturbances beyond
members’ control

€60 billion

Activated “in the
context of a joint
EU/IMF support,”
but also reviewed
for consistency
with EU rules;
linked as a matter
of Council policy

European Stability
Mechanism

Members of
the euro area

To mobilize funding
and provide stability
support under strict
conditionality; if
indispensable to
safeguard the stability of
the euro area as a whole
and of its member states

€500 billionc

Technical and
financial IMF
participation to be
sought “whenever
possible”; while
not legally
necessary, linked
as a matter of
Council policy

Chiang Mai
Initiative
Multilateralization

10 member states
of ASEAN plus
China, Japan and
South Korea

To address balanceof-payments and
short-term liquidity
difficulties; supplement
existing international
financial arrangements

$240 billion

Beyond 30 percent
of a country’s
allotment,
disbursements are
formally linked to
an IMF program

Arab Monetary
Fund

22 Arab countries
in the Middle
East and
North Africa

Among other things,
to correct payments
disequilibria, and
to foster currency
stability through
short- and mediumterm credit facilities

$4.8 billion

Ordinary loans
are usually
accompanied by
an IMF program;
other types of
assistance not
necessarily linked

EU members
that have not
adopted the euro
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Name

Eligible Members

Purpose

Size

Latin American
Reserve Fundd

Bolivia,
Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador,
Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay and
Venezuela

To support members’
balance of payments
with credits and
guarantees; to improve
the conditions of
international reserve
investments

North American
Framework
Agreement

Canada, Mexico,
and the United
States

$14 billion
To provide short-term
support through Treasury
and Fed 90-day swaps,
renewable up to one year

$4.7 billion

Nature of Link
to IMF

Not formally
linked, but
often linked de
facto through
overlapping
programs

US Treasury
requires letter
from IMF
managing director

Contingent Reserve Brazil, Russia,
Arrangement
India, China and
South Africa

To meet shortterm balance-ofpayments pressures
through liquidity
and precautionary
instruments

$100 billion

Beyond 30 percent
of allotment,
linked to an
IMF program

Eurasian Fund for
Stabilization and
Developmente

Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan,
Russia and
Tajikistan

To provide financial
credits, loans and
grants to ensure longrun economic stability
of members and foster
economic integration

$8.5 billion

Not formally
linked, but
sometimes
de facto

SAARC Swap
Arrangementf

Afghanistan,
Bangladesh,
Bhutan, India,
Maldives, Nepal,
Pakistan and
Sri Lanka

$2.0 billion
To address short-term
liquidity or balance-ofpayments difficulties; to
supplement international
financing arrangements

No explicit role
for the IMF

Sources: IMF (2017g); institutional websites; author’s assessment.
Notes:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Annual lending capacity.
Formerly referred to as Medium-Term Financial Assistance, which was created in 1988.
Total lending capacity; the ESM is capitalized at €704.8 billion.
Transformed from the Andean Reserve Fund into FLAR in 1989.
Previously known as the Eurasian Economic Community Anti-Crisis Fund, established in 2009.
SAARC is South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.
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Table 2: Latin American Reserve Fund — Resources and Access (US$ millions unless otherwise
noted)
Country

Subscribed
Capitala

Paid-in Capitala

Access Limitb

Max.
Access

Max.
Access
(% of
IMF
Quota)c

Max.
Access
(% of
GDP)d

Max. Access
(% of
Short-term
Liabilities)d

US$
millions

Share
(%)

US$
millions

Share
(%)

Liquidity
Facility

Balance of
Payments
Facility

Bolivia

328

8.3

245

8.33

270

637

637

188

1.88

134

Colombia

656

16.7

491

16.69

491

1,228

1,228

43

0.44

11

Costa Rica

656

16.7

488

16.59

488

1220

1220

234

2.14

48

Ecuador

328

8.3

245

8.33

270

637

637

65

0.65

68

Paraguay

328

8.3

245

8.33

245

613

613

216

2.23

13

Peru

656

16.7

491

16.69

491

1228

1,228

65

0.64

16

Uruguay

328

8.3

246

8.36

246

615

615

102

1.17

n/a

Venezuela

656

16.7

491

16.69

491

1,228

1,228

23

0.25

4

3,936

100

2,942

100

Total

Data sources:
a
http://flar.net/estructura-de-capital/
b
http://flar.net/lineas-de-credito/
c
Converting quotas to US$ at 1.409 US$ per Special Drawing Right (SDR).
d
World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2018.

Rica joined FLAR in 2000, Uruguay in 2009 and
Paraguay in 2014. Table 2 provides an overview
of FLAR’s capital structure, facilities and access.
FLAR’s total subscribed capital is $3.94 billion,
of which $2.94 billion was paid in as of February
2018.13 The institution can also borrow on the
capital markets by issuing bonds, although it
has done so on only two occasions. FLAR has
lent both three-year balance-of-payments loans
and liquidity operations of one year or less —
amounting to $4.9 billion and $4.4 billion in total,
respectively, during 1978–2013.14 Over the life of
the institution, Ecuador has been the greatest
user, followed by Peru, Colombia and Bolivia.15
FLAR and its Latin American advocates take pride
in several distinctive aspects of its operations.

First, while the amount of lending has been small
in the grand scheme of Latin American finance,
its financing was greater than that of the IMF
for the Andean countries during the 1980s, the
decade of greatest activity for the facility.16 Second,
in contrast to the RFAs in Europe and East Asia,
FLAR maintains no formal link to the IMF and
does not apply explicit policy conditionality to
financial support akin to the Fund’s. Nor has it
ever denied a (formal) loan request. In its lending
policies, the facility nonetheless appears to have
been relatively orthodox,17 has been effectively
accorded preferential status as a creditor by its
members18 and maintains a credit rating that is
higher than the sovereign bonds of its members,
situating it well for mediating funds between the
financial markets and its members. Third, led by
central bankers, FLAR’s governance and decision

13 All dollar figures in this report are listed in US dollars.
14 Since that period, FLAR has extended credits to Ecuador in 2014 ($617.6
million) and 2018 ($368.8 million), Venezuela in 2016 ($482.5 million)
and Costa Rica in 2018 ($1 billion). The grand total for the life of FLAR is
thus about $11.8 billion.
15 See also Rosero (2014) on lending history.
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16 See Titelman (2006) and Ocampo and Titelman (2012).
17 Parameters are established in the Constitutive Agreement and Bylaws,
FLAR (2013).
18 On the case of Peru in the 1980s, see Boughton (2001, 783–86) and
Eichengreen, Lombardi and Malkin (2018).

making has, at least until 2016, been relatively
collegial and uncontroversial. Owing to these
features, observers who search for institutional
arrangements for addressing financial crises that
exclude the IMF celebrate FLAR’s example.19
These distinctive features of FLAR must be placed in
a broader context, however. It would be misleading
to say that FLAR has no requirement to adjust
policies at all, in two respects. First, a country’s
application for balance-of-payments support must
include a report on the measures that it has or
will adopt to “correct or attenuate the balance of
payments lack of equilibrium” (FLAR 2013, 53). The
report addresses monetary and fiscal policy and
the financial sector, among other things, and serves
as the basis for board review and the decision to
grant support. One important difference with IMF
conditionality remains: the economic plan is drawn
up, and consequently “owned,” by the borrower.
Second, FLAR lending has, historically, often
taken place in proximity in time to IMF programs
and arrangements extended by the Exchange
Stabilization Fund (ESF) of the US Treasury.
Figure 1 displays the pattern of lending among
these three creditors to the countries in FLAR
since 1978. In some cases, FLAR, like the ESF,
extended bridge financing to IMF credits. In
other cases, FLAR’s repayment prospects were
strengthened by the adjustment requirements
imposed by the IMF program. In both cases, FLAR’s
operations were economically and financially
intertwined with those of the global multilateral
institution. Not all of FLAR’s credits coincide with
IMF programs, and the overlap seems to have
been diminishing in recent years; however, it is
again evident in the present case of Ecuador.
Otherwise, FLAR’s relationship with the IMF,
while cordial, is distant relative to the Fund’s
relationship with the other two RFAs considered
here. The Bogotá- and Washington-based
institutions cooperate on capacity building and
technical assistance to members. But possibilities
for the exchange of information are restricted
by the absence, at least for the moment, of a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) between
them, such as exists between FLAR and the ESM
and the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research
Office (AMRO). Perhaps the most important

19 For discussion of bypasses to the IMF, see Medhora (2017). See also
Perry (2013) and Grabel (2017, 152–57).

element of explicit institutional cooperation
is an agreement that capital contributions to
FLAR can be counted as members’ international
reserves under the definition of the IMF.
Despite its good repayment history, FLAR faces
a number of challenges at the moment. First,
because its institutional budget is constrained,
with operating expenses at about $8 million per
year (FLAR 2017, 8), the staff of the executive
president, headquartered in Bogotá, is stretched
thin. Its capacity to conduct surveillance and
assess country policies, let alone design country
programs should it be given the mandate to do
so, is similarly restricted. Second, the consensusoriented governance of the institution is under
strain, principally because of cleavages that have
emerged in recent years among the membership.
Stress on FLAR governance is particularly evident
in its disbursement to Venezuela — undertaken
without a parallel program with the IMF — which
was first announced in July 2016. At that moment,
the Venezuelan economy had already entered its
downward spiral, the country’s humanitarian
catastrophe was beginning, and its central bank
was desperate for foreign exchange. Objectively,
prospects for Venezuela were questionable, but
the board of directors approved a disbursement
nonetheless. After FLAR issued a loan and
later replaced it, the ultimate outcome of this
contentious process was a credit of $482.5 million,
an amount that then exactly matched Venezuela’s
paid-in capital. The size of the credit suggests
that several members of the board, all central
bank governors, took the view that access up
to the amount of their capital contributions
should be relatively unencumbered. Most of this
credit remains outstanding but was serviced at
least through 2018 even while Venezuela was
renegotiating its terms with other creditors and
grappling with US sanctions. Standard and Poor’s
(S&P) and Moody’s reaffirmed the institution’s
favourable credit rating in March and May 2019,
respectively, albeit with a negative outlook by
S&P.20 Uncertainty about the future of this loan
nonetheless poses a continuing challenge to FLAR.
FLAR also has outstanding credits to Costa Rica
and Ecuador, with those to Ecuador raising
questions about the repetitive nature of that
20 See S&P (2018). Moody’s statement is available at www.moodys.com/
research/Moodys-affirms-FLARs-Aa2-rating-maintains-stable-outlook-PR_399203.
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Figure 1: Loans to FLAR Members by the IMF, ESF and FLAR, 1978–2017 (US$ millions)
1978 Peru
1979 Peru
1979 Uruguay
1980 Bolivia
1980 Costa Rica
1980 Uruguay
1981 Bolivia
1981 Costa Rica
1981 Uruguay
1982 Costa Rica
1982 Ecuador
1982 Peru
1983 Colombia
1983 Ecuador
1983 Peru
1983 Uruguay
1984 Bolivia
1984 Colombia
1984 Ecuador
1984 Peru
1985 Colombia
1985 Costa Rica
1985 Ecuador
1985 Bolivia
1985 Uruguay
1986 Bolivia
1986 Ecuador
1987 Costa Rica
1987 Ecuador
1987 Peru
1987 Venezuela
1988 Bolivia
1988 Ecuador
1988 Peru
1989 Bolivia
1989 Costa Rica
1989 Ecuador
1989 Peru
1989 Venezuela
1990 Bolivia
1990 Costa Rica
1990 Ecuador
1990 Peru
1990 Uruguay
1990 Venezuela
1991 Bolivia
1991 Costa Rica
1991 Ecuador
1991 Peru
1992 Bolivia
1992 Uruguay
1993 Costa Rica
1993 Peru
1994 Bolivia
1994 Ecuador
1995 Costa Rica
1995 Ecuador
1996 Ecuador
1996 Peru
1996 Uruguay
1996 Venezuela
1997 Uruguay
1998 Bolivia
1998 Ecuador
1999 Colombia
1999 Peru
1999 Uruguay
2000 Ecuador
2000 Uruguay
2001 Peru
2002 Bolivia
2002 Uruguay
2003 Bolivia
2003 Colombia
2003 Costa Rica
2003 Ecuador
2003 Paraguay
2004 Peru
2005 Colombia
2005 Ecuador
2005 Uruguay
2006 Paraguay
2007 Peru
2009 Costa Rica
2009 Ecuador
2012 Ecuador
2014 Ecuador
2016 Ecuador
2016 Venezuela
2017 Costa Rica
2017 Ecuador
2017 Venezuela

IMF
ESF
FLAR Balance of Payments Facility
FLAR Liquidity Facility
FLAR Debt Restructuring Facility
FLAR Contingency Facility

1000
Data sources: IMF; FLAR; Henning (1999).
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country’s drawings and whether its regional
neighbours should insist on more sustained
adjustment in order to wean Quito off of its reliance
on the institution. These loans could give pause
to members, existing and prospective, when
considering injecting additional resources to FLAR.
Finally, and importantly, FLAR remains small in
size financially, which places restrictions on the
scope of FLAR’s financial support for members.
Therefore, while FLAR can provide liquidity to
members in modest quantities, countries that
encounter more severe crises that require larger
volumes of financing and deeper adjustment
must turn to the IMF, the current program with
Ecuador again being a case in point (IMF 2019a).
FLAR’s comparatively small size is not due to
the absence of international reserves in the
region that could be mobilized. As of mid-2018,
foreign exchange reserves of Latin American
countries totalled about $844 billion, of which
Brazil held about $380 billion and Mexico
$178 billion. But these large reserve holders
are not members of FLAR (which collectively
held about $159 billion in reserves).
Expanding the membership to the large countries
of the region is, and should be, a strategic
objective of the institution. The case for doing
so rests on catching up with the deepening of
economic and social interdependence among
countries in the region. Not only do economic
crises propagate from one country to the next,
but regional neighbours are also subjected to
migration shocks by humanitarian catastrophes
in Venezuela and Central America. An expanded
FLAR could play a greater constructive role in the
context of other forms of regional solidarity.21
If it were further developed, FLAR could serve
as a regional partner for the IMF. The Fund
could benefit from an enhanced FLAR in the
same way that it can, in principle, from the
development of other RFAs: incorporation of
local knowledge, expanded and more frequent
surveillance, bridge financing during program
negotiations, financial contributions to loan
packages and softening of IMF stigma.

21 Proposals for developing and expanding FLAR include Latin American
Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2012), Ocampo and Titelman
(2012), Agosin (2013), Rosero (2014) and Titelman et al. (2014).

Scaling up FLAR to perform such a role would
require inducting Brazil, Mexico, Chile or Argentina,
or some combination of this group. In order to elicit
the interest of these countries, however, the current
membership would have to take two measures that
would transform the character of the institution.
First, it would have to open the governance
provisions for the introduction of weighted voting.
Large prospective members are unlikely to accept
the one-country, one-vote rule that formally applies
to decisions on loans as well as amendments to the
founding articles. Second, it would have to create
a mechanism to assure these likely creditors that
borrowers will undertake adjustment when that is
necessary to restore external balance and access
financial markets. Building a capacity to design
policy conditionality into lending programs would
be one route but would require a considerable
investment in staff resources and budget, not to
mention intrusion into national policy making.
The faster, less expensive route would be to
simply link to IMF programs. Most of the current
membership would probably prefer the first route
to the second, but no RFA outside of Europe has
yet come close to successfully pursuing it.
It is not clear that the divergent preferences of
small and large countries can be bridged. Existing
members have shown little interest in governance
reform or an IMF link. Large prospective members
could not rely on the institution to assist them
in a crisis, because they would too big for FLAR
to rescue. Their interest in joining would stem
from spillover effects from instability within
regional neighbours, although none of the four
have been particularly enthusiastic sponsors of
regional projects in the past. A cleavage within
the region between orthodox and heterodox
governments could perpetuate their reluctance.
Nonetheless, by stating the conditions under
which FLAR might expand, a course can be
charted in the event that political circumstances
become more propitious in the future.

East Asia
The countries of the ASEAN+3 group have two
decades of experience developing regional
financial institutions for East Asia. Shortly after
the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, they
launched the Chiang Mai Initiative. After the global
financial crisis of 2008-2009, they scaled up and
multilateralized the facility, creating the Chiang Mai
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Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM).22 ASEAN+3
also agreed upon an economic surveillance unit,
the AMRO, which was established in 2011.

ASEAN+3 Institutions
Table 3 shows the current state of the CMIM and
the access limits relative to IMF quotas and shortterm external liabilities. As can be seen there, the
five original members of ASEAN can, in principle,
draw up to $22.76 billion under the facility. In the
case of Indonesia, for example, this access amounts
to roughly 3.4 times the country’s quota in the IMF,
representing about half of its short-term external
liabilities. In the case of the Philippines, it amounts
to about 7.7 times its IMF quota. (For comparison,
Indonesia borrowed $18 billion from the IMF, World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank [ADB] as
part of its 1997-1998 rescue package, which included
another $18 billion in a second line of defence that
was not disbursed.) However, most of the funds can
be accessed only if the borrower also agrees to an
IMF program and its conditionality — a provision
known as the “IMF link.” The delinked portion of
these funds is currently 30 percent of the total, or
$6.8 billion for the large Southeast Asian countries.
In 2014, ASEAN+3 officials introduced a
precautionary line into the CMIM, following the
development of precautionary facilities by the
IMF. Under the CMIM Precautionary Line (PL),
members with highly rated policies could qualify
in advance for credit up to their access limits to
guard against being sideswiped by global financial
volatility. This facility was differentiated from
regular access, labelled the Stability Facility (SF).
The two could not be drawn simultaneously, but a
country that had drawn on the PL could convert to
a stability drawing if longer-term financing were
needed, in which case it would be expected to
also take an adjustment program from the IMF.
Because the original Chiang Mai Initiative had
been inspired by antipathy toward the IMF after
the 1997-1998 crisis, the link to the Fund has been
contentious among the membership. The large
creditor countries, Japan and China, have adhered
to the link, while the Southeast Asian countries
22 On financial arrangements in East Asia, see Grimes (2009; 2018);
Katada (2012); Cohen (2012); Miyoshi et al. (2013); Katada and
Armijo (2014; 2015); Ciorciari (2011); Kawai (2015); Chang (2016);
Henning (2002; 2019); Henning and Katada (2016); Chey (2009);
Sterland (2017a; 2017b); Eichengreen, Lombardi and Malkin (2018);
Pitakdumrongkit (2016); Darvas (2017); Sussangkarn (2011; 2017);
Kadogawa et al. (2018); Subacchi (2018); and Truman (2018b).
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have objected, seeking to roll it back over time
to establish a regional rescue vehicle that can
operate more independently of the Fund. The
requirement that a borrower agree to a program
with the IMF discourages its use. But the ASEAN+3
finance ministers and central bank governors
have declined to increase the delinked portion
beyond 30 percent (ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers
and Central Bank Governors 2018).23 Resistance
to increasing the delinked portion, in addition to
other issues, has created rifts within the ASEAN+3
group that are unusually deep at the moment.
While the development of the CMIM originated
in popular rejection of the IMF “stigma,” some
creditor-country officials are rethinking the idea of
progressively loosening the connection to the Fund.
If East Asia were ever to create a capacity to
address financial crises on a fully regional basis,
which a number of observers advocate, a robust
capacity for surveillance and economic analysis
would be essential. ASEAN+3 took a major step
forward in this respect when creating AMRO
and locating it in Singapore (Chabchitrchaidol,
Nakagawa and Nemoto 2018). In February 2016, the
group upgraded the unit to a full-fledged public
international organization (AMRO 2016a; 2017a).
Its management and staff, which numbered about
57 at the end of 2018, are mandated to monitor
and assess macroeconomic policies and financial
soundness of members, identify vulnerabilities
and recommend measures to mitigate risks. Its
officials brief the ASEAN+3 deputies and ministerial
meetings and, in April 2017, on the twentieth
anniversary of the onset of the Asian financial
crisis, published their first surveillance report for
the region (AMRO 2017b). The organization now
publishes a steady stream of country surveillance
reports and regional economic outlooks.24 AMRO
is also tasked with supporting members in the
implementation and further development of the
CMIM (AMRO 2016b; 2016c), discussed below.
It is important to note that, owing partly to the
link, the CMIM has never actually been activated.
But it would be wrong to conclude that the facility
is therefore inconsequential, for several reasons.
First, the CMIM serves as a focal point around
which finance ministries and central banks in the
region confer and develop common strategies

23 See also ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (2017)
and Khor (2017).
24 Available at https://amro-asia.org/publications/.

Table 3: Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization — Resources and Access
(US$ billions unless otherwise noted)
Country

Financial
Contributiona

Purchasing
Multiple

Maximum
Swap
Amount

Max. Drawing
(% of IMF Quota)

Max. Drawing
(% of Short-term
Liabilities)b

De-linked
Portion
30%

40%

US$
billions

Share
(%)

192

80

China
(ex Hong
Kong)

68.4

28.5

0.5

34.20

78

4

10.2

13.6

Hong
Kong

8.4

3.5

2.5

6.30

n/a

n/a

1.8

2.5

Japan

76.8

32.0

0.5

38.40

86

n/a

11.5

15.3

Korea

38.4

16.0

1.0

38.40

308

n/a

11.5

15.3

48

20

Indonesia

9.104

3.793

2.5

22.76

339

54

6.8

9.1

Thailand

9.104

3.793

2.5

22.76

491

43

6.8

9.1

Malaysia

9.104

3.793

2.5

22.76

434

27

6.8

9.1

Singapore

9.104

3.793

2.5

22.76

404

n/a

6.8

9.1

Philippines

9.104

3.793

2.5

22.76

771

157

6.8

9.1

Vietnam

2.00

0.833

5.0

10.0

600

71

3

4

Cambodia

0.24

0.100

5.0

1.20

475

69

0.3

0.4

Myanmar

0.12

0.050

5.0

0.60

80

79

0.1

0.2

Brunei
Darussalam

0.06

0.025

5.0

0.30

69

n/a

0.09

0.1

Lao PDR

0.06

0.025

5.0

0.30

196

42

0.09

0.1

Total

240.0

100.00

Plus-3
China

ASEAN

Note: Converting quotas to US$ at US$1.445 per SDR.
Data sources:
a.
AMRO, “Key Points of the CMIM Agreement,” at www.amro-asia.org/key-points-of-the-cmim-agreement/.
b
World Bank, International Debt Statistics, 2016.

for crisis prevention and response. Second, its
existence alters the behaviour of other institutions
in the system; the IMF has taken pains to appeal
to Southeast Asian countries by reviewing
conditionality and offering precautionary facilities,
among other things. Third, as a matter of principle,
disbursements should not be used as the most
significant measure of effectiveness; precautionary
arrangements are most effective if they sustain
market confidence and therefore never have to

be drawn. Finally, these institutions serve as a
foundation on which to build, and ASEAN+3 could
well activate the CMIM at some point in the future.
Massive unilateral reserve accumulation serves as
the backdrop for the political economy of East Asian
regionalism. Most of these reserves are held by the
“+3” countries — China, Japan and South Korea.
But the holdings of Southeast Asian countries
are large by the standards of EMDCs, amounting
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to roughly $840 billion. These holdings serve as
the first line of defence against financial market
volatility, an additional reason why these countries
have not resorted to official financing since the
global financial crisis. They represent a hedge
against the failure of regional or global cooperation,
albeit an extraordinarily expensive one.25
The ASEAN+3 institutions face a number
of questions and strategic challenges with
respect to their relationship to the IMF,
their institutional development and the
divergent preferences of member states,
and the political economy of the region.

Coordination with the IMF
With respect to the relationship with the IMF, the
link creates the need to coordinate the operational
and policy aspects of co-financing. In order to
smooth the machinery for activation, ASEAN+3
and the IMF have jointly conducted “test runs”
annually during 2016–2018. Based on a countryspecific scenario agreed in advance, the test
requires officials to communicate, coordinate
and activate the financial accounts through
which funds would be disbursed in an actual
contingency. They revealed several weaknesses —
exchange of information, timing of disbursements
and repayments, and policy conditionality —
which are being addressed by both sides.
The ability to share information about country
conditions, forecasts and programs is closely tied to
the legal status of the institutions involved. AMRO
is a bona fide public international organization
but does not itself provide financing. The CMIM
provides finance but is a contract among the
14 parties (ASEAN+3, plus Hong Kong) rather
than a formal international organization. This
complicated arrangement does not preclude
cooperation between the Fund and AMRO on
technical assistance, training and joint meetings
(AMRO 2017c). But it does complicate the exchange
of information on potential programs and, as
mentioned above, some member countries
caution non-Asians against using AMRO as
the conduit for cooperation on matters that
ASEAN+3 has not explicitly delegated to it.
The CMIM and the IMF differ with respect to the
modalities of disbursements and repayments. At

25 See, in this regard, Lipscy and Lee (2019).
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the time of activation, the CMIM would disburse
the full amount of its commitment up front, as
would be the case in a BSA. The IMF, however,
disburses in tranches according to a schedule
that is established in the program to coincide
with financing needs and implementation
of policy reforms. Disbursements can be
suspended if the borrower does not satisfy the
Fund during its reviews, which are conducted
quarterly. This difference can be treated by
phasing CMIM disbursements similarly.
The repayments schedule is more problematic.
The issue is which institution is to be repaid
first and which is left bearing the outstanding
credit risk. The CMIM was originally a shortterm liquidity facility based on bilateral central
bank swaps and was subsequently organized
to mobilize them jointly. After amendments in
2014, the linked portion could be tapped for a
term of one year, renewable twice for a total of
three years (ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors 2014).26 But the IMF’s
Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) would typically be
available for drawings for up to three years, with
full repayment not being received until 3.25 to 5
years after the last disbursement. Under those
arrangements, ASEAN+3 would have been repaid
first, leaving the IMF with the residual risk, which
was unacceptable to the IMF. So, at their meeting
in Manila in May 2018, the finance ministers and
central bank governors decided to make it possible
to align the term of CMIM credits with those of
the IMF for both the standard SF, which would
correspond to the SBA, and the PL, which would
correspond to the Precautionary and Liquidity Line
(PLL) at the Fund (ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers
and Central Bank Governors 2018, Annex).27
By its rules, the IMF needs “firm commitments”
that the program is funded on a 12-month rolling
basis and “good prospects” at the outset that it will
be funded for the full duration of the program (IMF
2013a, 44). Given that CMIM-SF credit is initially
made available for only one year, the Executive
Level Decision Making Body (ELDMB) would have
to renew the credit much earlier than ASEAN+3

26 The delinked portion has a term of six months, renewable three times, for
a total of two years.
27 The changes were discussed at the meeting of the finance and central
bank deputies meeting in December 2018 and formalized at the
ministerial meeting in May 2019, along with other amendments to the
CMIM Agreement. See ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors (2019).

officials had originally envisaged in order to meet
this requirement. Failure to do so could bring the
entire program to a screeching halt midway, unless
other sources of funding could be found. ASEAN+3
finance ministry and central bank officials seem
open to considering renewal of swaps at such time
that the IMF’s financing assurances are satisfied
on the 12-month rolling basis for the duration of
the program, but whether the problem is fully
rectified remains an important operational issue.
The IMF and ASEAN+3 institutions disagree over
whether policy conditionality should be joint or
simply led by the IMF. ASEAN+3 member states
also disagree among themselves on this matter.
Some countries, particularly in Southeast Asia,
insist that AMRO and the CMIM must develop
their own view as a region as to the conditions
that should be applied to program lending with
the linked portion. Such conditions should, to
a significant extent, be the common product of
the regional institutions and the Fund working
together, they maintain. Other member states
argue that the regional institutions are not
yet ready for program design, negotiation and
implementation. For their part, officials at the IMF
stress that there should be a single set of policy
conditions and that the Fund should lead on the
macroeconomic framework and program design.
Fund officials can be expected to resist efforts to
develop a common conditionality framework.

Challenges
The member states of ASEAN+3 have not yet agreed
on what exactly the relationship between their
two regional financial institutions should be. The
text of the AMRO agreement declares its purpose
to be “to contribute to securing the economic and
financial stability of the region through conducting
regional economic surveillance and supporting
the implementation of the regional financial
arrangement” (AMRO 2016a, article 2). And it
recognizes the CMIM as a partner with which
AMRO will promote regional cooperation “together”
(AMRO 2016a, preamble). Moreover, the deputies
have identified the development of the Economic
Review and Policy Dialogue matrix, operational
readiness and “smooth implementation” of the
CMIM as AMRO’s tasks and they approved the
appointment of a deputy director and a staff
team with responsibility for these activities
(Chabchitrchaidol, Nakagawa and Nemoto 2018).

At the same time, article 3 of the AMRO Agreement
defines the institution’s function in this regard to
be to “support members in the implementation
of the regional financial arrangement” (AMRO
2016a, article 3, c; emphasis added). This language
suggests that the national finance ministries
and central banks are expected to mediate
AMRO’s work as it would be expressed in ELDMB
deliberations over CMIM policy and disbursements
in a crisis scenario. While AMRO would analyze
economic requirements and policy conditions
that might be applied to a country’s borrowing,
and advise the deputies accordingly, the ultimate
responsibility for negotiations with a requesting
country, building consensus within the ELDMB
on activation and coordinating the terms of
disbursements with the IMF would ultimately
fall on the co-chairs of the deputies’ group.
Some member states insist on the co-chairs’
prerogatives in this regard, resist delegation to
AMRO and advise third parties accordingly.
This awkward decision-making arrangement relies
heavily on the ability of the co-chairs to understand
the substance of programs, balance competing
considerations, negotiate with counterparts and
communicate clearly. While the IMF managing
director must do much of the same, her job is
facilitated by supervision of the design of the
program, preparation of documents and physical
proximity to the executive board. The task of the
co-chairs, one from the “+3” and the other from
the ASEAN group, is made more difficult by their
annual rotation. It is safe to say that no financial
facility has been activated by a decision-making
mechanism that resembles this one. While the
test runs have been designed to iron out glitches
in this process, one should be forgiven for being
skeptical that this can operate effectively in a
crisis. The challenges posed by the separation of
the CMIM and AMRO, moreover, would seem to
consign ASEAN+3 for the time being to accepting
programs that are designed by the IMF.
As far as the delinked portion is concerned,
ASEAN+3, the CMIM and AMRO are probably
ready to activate should a country come to the
group to request assistance. AMRO is developing
the conditionality framework that would apply
and, as an operational matter, the procedural
and legal glitches have probably been cleared.
The barriers that remain have to do with
uncertainty about the short-term temporary
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nature of financial need, creditor risk aversion
and political tensions among member states.
Indonesia poses a potential challenge for the
region. Its economy remains vulnerable to a
global downturn, yet Indonesia is known for
popular aversion to the IMF since the 1997-1998
crisis.28 Officials in Jakarta would be likely to
opt first for support for budget operations from
the World Bank and the ADB, supplemented by
BSAs with central banks. Bank Indonesia has
had swap agreements in place with the central
banks of China and South Korea and, over the
course of 2018, renewed or opened new swaps
with Japan, Australia and Singapore. The strategy
replicates the approach taken by the Indonesian
government during the turbulence of 2008-2009.
To enhance the package, Indonesia and its partners
in ASEAN+3 could, in principle, activate the
delinked portion of the CMIM-SF or the CMIMPL. Such a prospect poses interesting questions
about how and whether the CMIM and AMRO
could coordinate with multilateral development
banks and BSAs. The World Bank and the ADB
might be willing participants in such a package
but some central banks would likely seek the
comfort of a Fund program when activating BSAs.

Next Steps
Fundamentally, the separation of surveillance and
analysis in AMRO from the financial resources
in the CMIM, and the holding of the CMIM’s
resources in the separate accounts of the national
central banks rather than pooling, reflect the
reticence of the 13 member countries to make
the collective leap to creating an embryonic
Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). There are important
reasons for their unwillingness, thus far, to
do so, which are discussed below. Yet, further
progress toward developing regional institutions
can still be made within these constraints.
Creating a full-fledged RFA that mirrors the
institutional model of the ESM or the IMF itself
would call for three important institutional
reforms. First, the member states would agree
to combine AMRO and the CMIM into a unified
institution, allowing the secretariat to analyze
requests for disbursements without national
officials serving as intermediaries and to design

28 See also Sterland (2017a).
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programs, negotiate them with borrowers,
propose agreements to the ELDMB for approval
and represent the combined institution to third
parties, including other institutions such as the
IMF. Second, ASEAN+3 member states would
agree to pool the reserves that back the CMIM into
a single account. This could be done either as a
quota contribution, as in the case of the IMF, or as
a capital contribution, as in the case of the ESM.
Either way, financial operations would be greatly
simplified, and disbursements would be more
certain. Finally, the agreement underpinning the
new, combined institution should be made public.
This is not the case with the CMIM Agreement,29
and disclosure would be essential for an institution
that lends large sums on programs of its own
design, whether they are lenient or austere.
While these steps would be necessary to create the
equivalent of an AMF, it is not clear that ASEAN+3
will take them. A divergence of preferences among
member states presents a formidable barrier to
taking this institutional path. The rivalry between
China and Japan for influence within the region is
well known.30 There is also tension between each of
them and South Korea, between the +3 as a group
and the 10 Southeast Asian countries, as well as
among the Southeast Asian countries themselves.
A common interest in the 13 states (plus Hong
Kong) in avoiding financial turbulence in the region
has underpinned the ASEAN+3 institutions so
far. Regional cooperation survived, and was even
strengthened, during the global financial crisis.
Conflict with the Trump administration could
strengthen incentives to overcome their differences.
But whether ASEAN+3 cooperation survives a
financial shock that comes from within the region,
rather than outside, or a crisis in the area of
foreign policy and security remains to be seen.
In light of preference divergence, East Asian
countries have avoided putting all of their
cooperation “eggs” in the regional basket. Seeking
financial options that cannot be effectively
vetoed by neighbours in the region, they have
built up precautionary reserves unilaterally and

29 One reason is that the agreement embodies the institutional and
governance provisions of the CMIM as well as the more market-sensitive
terms of CMIM disbursements. Publication of the agreement would
disclose both. Rewriting the agreements by placing the governance
provisions in one document and the transaction-specific provisions in
program documents would enable disclosure of the former without
publicizing the latter.
30 Benjamin J. Cohen (2012), among others, emphasizes this point.

developed potentially rivalrous networks of
BSAs. And, of course, they maintain the link to
the IMF. States in the region are instead creating
a more complicated patchwork of institutions.

Europe
Europe is, of course, the largest and most developed
of all the world’s regions. Debates about the role
of regional institutions and their relationships
with global multilateral ones are largely inspired
by this region’s example. The management of the
euro-crisis programs in the troika has received
particular attention as a set of cases of both
cooperation and conflict among international
financial institutions.31 This experience has inspired
reconsideration both in Europe and at the IMF
of their own policies and the arrangements and
conventions by which they relate to one another.
This subsection focuses mainly on the ESM,
enhancements to which are in the process of
being introduced. It is important to remember
that the ESM’s evolution takes place within a
European institutional ecosystem that includes
the European Commission, the ECB and the
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), and a
corpus of law, regulations and procedures relating
to fiscal policies, sovereign debt and banking
union. Legally, the ESM sits outside the EU treaty
framework and the Community method32 —
although it is nonetheless guided by Council
bodies and, in particular, the Eurogroup — and
reforms to the ESM are subject to ratification by
some of the national parliaments in the euro area.
Changes to European institutions will affect not
only how crises are prosecuted in the euro area
but also the global safety net more broadly.

European Facilities and the Troika
Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has
a cluster of institutions that can become involved
when a country requests financial assistance in
a crisis. Some of the financial facilities predate
the crisis and some were created and expanded
during the crisis: the balance-of-payments facility,
the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism

31 See, for example, Pisani-Ferry, Sapir and Wolff (2013); Leipold (2013);
European Parliament (2014); IMF (2015b); IEO (2016); Kincaid (2016);
Véron (2016); Blustein (2016); Lundsager (2017); and Henning (2017).
See also Tumpel-Gugerell (2017).
32 That is, outside the regular process by which the Commission initiates and
the Council and European Parliament approve legislation.

(EFSM), the European Financial Stability Facility
(EFSF) and the ESM. The largest of these, the
ESM, was created in 2012 by the euro-area
member states via an intergovernmental treaty
and endowed with total capital of €704.8 billion,
of which €80.5 billion is paid in, giving it a
lending capacity of €500 billion (see Table 4).
Note four features of the ESM that relate to its
cooperation in the context of the global safety net.
First, the stated purpose of the ESM is to provide
“stability support under strict conditionality...if
indispensable to safeguard the financial stability
of the euro area as a whole and of its Member
States” (European Council 2012, article 3). Second,
recital 8 of its treaty states: “The ESM will cooperate
very closely with the International Monetary
Fund (‘IMF’) in providing stability support. The
active participation of the IMF will be sought,
both at technical and financial level. A euro area
Member State requesting financial assistance
from the ESM is expected to address, wherever
possible, a similar request to the IMF” (ibid.).
The ESM is also expected to conduct its DSA
together with the IMF, “whenever appropriate
and possible” (ibid., article 13, paragraph 1[b]).
Third, the ESM can raise funds on the capital
markets and has a debt management office
to handle bond issuance. Finally, it also has
a broad set of lending instruments and in
some respects, in principle, more flexibility
in lending arrangements than the IMF.
These institutions prosecuted the euro crisis along
with the IMF in most, but not all, instances of
financial programs.33 In doing so, however, they
argued publicly over some matters that were
important to the design of programs, including
primacy of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
fiscal targets, banking union issues, monetary
policy, the Emergency Liquidity Assistance,
the involvement of the newly created SSM and
the IMF’s interest in structural issues such as
labour markets and wages. Most famously,
European creditor countries were chastened
by the IMF’s advocacy of even more favourable
easing of the terms of official debt to Greece
during the third program, arguing that the
country’s debt was sustainable in the long term
with only modest relief. These disagreements,
33 The label “the institutions” was substituted for “the troika” as the number
of institutions in the arrangement grew beyond the original three, the IMF,
the European Commission and the ECB, with inclusion of the ESM.
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Table 4: ESM Shareholder Contributions and Ratings
Member State

Credit Rating (S&P/
Moody’s/Fitch)

ESM Contribution
Key (%)

Capital Subscription
(€ billion)

Paid-in Capital
(€ billion)

Austria

(AA+/Aa1/AA+)

2.7644

19.48

2.23

Belgium

(AA/Aa3/AA-)

3.4534

24.34

2.78

Cyprus

(BB+/Ba3/BB+)

0.1949

1.37

0.16

Estonia

(AA-/A1/A+)

0.1847

1.30

0.15

Finland

(AA+/Aa1/AA+)

1.7852

12.58

1.44

France

(AA/Aa2/AA)

20.2471

142.70

16.31

(AAA/Aaa/AAA)

26.9616

190.02

21.72

Greece

(B+/B3/B)

2.7975

19.72

2.25

Ireland

(A+/A2/A+)

1.5814

11.15

1.27

(BBB/Baa2/BBB)

17.7917

125.40

14.33

Latvia

(A-/A3/A-)

0.2746

1.935

0.22

Lithuania

(A/A3/A-)

0.4063

2.86

0.33

(AAA/Aaa/AAA)

0.2487

1.75

0.20

(A-/A3/A+)

0.0726

0.51

0.06

Netherlands

(AAA/Aaa/AAA)

5.6781

40.02

4.57

Portugal

(BBB-/Ba1/BBB)

2.4921

17.56

2.01

Slovakia

(A+/A2/A+)

0.8184

5.77

0.66

Slovenia

(A+/Baa1/A-)

0.4247

2.99

0.34

Spain

(A-/Baa1/A-)

11.8227

83.33

9.52

100%

704.8

80.55

Germany

Italy

Luxembourg
Malta

Total

Source: ESM, EFSF ESM New Investor Presentation, July 2018.

along with the fundamental problem of securing
greater stability for the euro area, motivated
revival of proposals for creating an EMF (Gros
and Mayer 2010; Schäuble 2010; BénassyQuéré et al. 2018; Franco-German Economist
Group 2017; European Commission 2017a).

Building Up the ESM
During 2017, political developments opened
opportunities for deepening institutional reform
of the euro area and the European Union. The
member states launched discussion of changes in
the areas of the EU budget, by advancing proposals
for a euro-area budget and a new fiscal instrument
to foster convergence, as well as of the banking
union and ESM. The European Council agreed in
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June 2019 to enhancements of the ESM subject to
further specification of a set of related documents,
setting December as the target for completion of
the package, at which point the revised ESM treaty
would be referred to member states for ratification.
The package falls short of creating the regional
“monetary fund” as early proposals envisioned,34
but would, if enacted, nonetheless substantially
enhance the authority of the institution and
realign its relationship with its peers.

34 See European Commission (2017a). The scope more closely follows the
Meseberg Declaration issued by the French and German governments on
June 19, 2018; see www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/germany/
events/article/europe-franco-german-declaration-19-06-18.

Once ratified, the enhancements to the ESM would
be several.35 First, the ESM would be given greater
authority to conduct economic surveillance of
member states, in particular with respect to the
sources of vulnerability to crises, in cooperation
with the Commission. Second, and perhaps most
importantly, the ESM would become the backstop
for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) by the end of
a transition period, January 2024 at the latest. The
decision-making mechanism for activation of the
backstop was especially contentious. Third, the
terms on which the precautionary facilities of the
ESM — the Precautionary Conditioned Credit Line
and the Enhanced Conditions Credit Line, which
have never been deployed — could be used by
“innocent bystanders” whose fundamentals are
sound would be clarified. Fourth, the ESM would
have an explicit mandate in debt restructuring
as a convener of creditors, a forum for their
coordination and a contributor to sustainability
analysis. Member states commit to introduce
single-limb aggregation collective action clauses
(CACs) into sovereign bond contracts as of 2022,
which would facilitate such restructuring when
necessary.36 Finally, the Luxembourg-based
institution would be charged more explicitly with
designing, negotiating and supervising programs,
again in cooperation with the Commission.37
Given the scope of these changes, the revisions
to the treaty broaden the stated purpose of the
ESM beyond simply providing assistance “under
strict conditionality” if necessary to preserve
stability of the “euro area as a whole.” They would
also permit lending on the basis of lighter, ex
ante qualification in the case of precautionary
facilities, financing through the SRF backstop
even when it is not necessarily clear that the
whole of the euro area is threatened, as well as
broader surveillance on the part of the ESM.38
As far as the legal instrument is concerned,
member states decided not to introduce these
changes via amendments to the European
treaties (as the European Commission proposed).
Instead, they amended the Treaty Establishing

35 See Eurogroup (2019); see also Regling (2018).
36 On this proposal see, for example, Sobel (2018a) and (2018b).
37 See, for example, the press conferences after meetings of the
Eurogroup on November 5 and 19, and December 4, 2018, at
https://video.consilium.europa.eu/en/webcast/985f7045-2944-44439c19-8cb4614bf817.
38 Eurogroup (2019, article 3).

the European Stability Mechanism, leaving
that treaty outside the legal framework of the
European Union. The ESM thus remains an
intergovernmental institution formally outside
the Community method. Nor have member states,
for the time being, altered the unanimity rule
in the ESM decisions on financial assistance.
Changes of this magnitude inevitably impinge
on the mandate and sensitivities of the other
institutions in Europe and the IMF. The ECB
objected to renaming the ESM, advocated
improving its precautionary facilities and
underscored the importance of disbursements to
the SRF being quick and automatic, subject to the
approval of only the boards of the institutions,
not member-state legislatures.39 The European
Commission raised objections to the infringement
of its responsibilities under the treaties for the
SGP, Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, and
the European Semester more broadly, among a
number of other things. The Commission also
wanted to retain responsibility for signing the MOU
with countries receiving assistance and carrying
out program analysis, including DSA. A number of
northern creditors, principally Germany, wish to
enhance the authorities of the ESM, while some of
the smaller countries and southern members tend
to side with the Commission in these disputes. To
define their division of labour, the Commission and
ESM struck an interinstitutional MOU of their own
in April 2018 and elaborated it in November 2018.40
The two institutions expect to revise the MOU once
the proposed changes to the ESM treaty take effect.
Even assuming agreement on the full ESM
package in December 2019, it remains unclear
when political circumstances among member
states will permit ratification of the revised
treaty. But if adoption proves not to be possible
in the near term, this agenda represents the
next feasible set of reforms once politics become
more propitious at some point in the future.
One might hope for a more ambitious agenda
for the monetary union, one that would truly
39 See ECB (2018). The ECB also called for clarification of its role in
programs, especially in light of the broadening of its mandate to financial
supervision with the creation of the SSM after the drafting and adoption
of the ESM treaty.
40 See “Memorandum of Understanding on the Working Relations between
the European Commission and the European Stability Mechanism,”
www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2018_04_27_mou_ec_esm.pdf.
European Commission and ESM (2018) provides an update. See also
Howarth and Spendzharova (2019).
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“complete” its institutional architecture with, for
example, all of the elements of a banking union
and genuine fiscal solidarity and risk sharing.41
But the next crises will arrive long before such
measures can be taken. Europe will face the next
crises with the institutions it has, or at best the
institutions as enhanced by the package presently
being finalized in the Eurogroup and Council.
It will thus be under this set of institutional
arrangements that architects of future financial
rescues will avoid, minimize or resolve conflicts
such as those that dogged the euro-crisis programs.

Union-wide Policy Assurances
One of the fundamental questions that has been
confronted, although perhaps not fully resolved, is
the role of euro-area-wide policies and institutions
in the context of a country program. This problem
emerged from the IMF’s standpoint in stark form
during the troika programs in the euro crisis.
Ireland, Portugal and Greece, for example, made
commitments to the Fund through letters of
intent as part of their programs. But euro-wide
policies — such as the fiscal rules, financial and
banking regulation, and monetary policy —
remained outside the scope of conditionality,
even though in several cases they were critical to
the success of the program. For example, the ECB
raised interest rates twice in 2011, which affected
general funding conditions in the euro area and
the ability of members to reach their program
benchmarks. The criticality of monetary policy,
in particular, prompted calls in some quarters
to put the ECB “on the other side of the table”
in program negotiations — that is, to ask it to
accept clear and binding policy commitments. The
problem became particularly acute in the case of
large countries, whose crises required euro-wide
solutions, and is one reason why the IMF did not
contribute financing to the 2012 program for the
Spanish banking system. The Fund’s evaluation of
euro-area programs (IMF 2015a) and the IEO study
(2016) prompted the Fund to examine the problem
of lending into currency unions generally.42
After extensive consultation with the Europeans,
as well as the authorities of the currency unions

41 Recent contributions include Claeys (2017), Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018);
and Kincaid (2019).
42 Various external studies include Blustein (2016); Brunnermeier, James
and Landau (2016); Henning (2017); Mody (2018); Lütz, Hilgersand and
Schneider (2019); Moschella (forthcoming).
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in Africa and the Eastern Caribbean, the Fund
staff adopted a delicate compromise. It would not
recommend that commitments or restrictions on
the policies of currency unions be incorporated
into program conditions, but instead sought
to codify and formalize recent practices about
providing assurances on union-wide policies.
Borrowing members’ own policy instruments
would be expected to shoulder the brunt of
the adjustment burden; only when national
measures were insufficient would assurances
be sought from union-level institutions. Union
policies must be critical to the success of the
program in these cases; assurances with respect
to them should be clear, specific, monitorable and
time bound; and they must be consistent with
institutions’ mandates and legal frameworks.43
Policy assurances would be provided in a letter
to the managing director that would accompany
the program documents as they were considered
and approved by the executive board. Particular
attention was given to the problem of providing
policy assurances without either appearing to
compromise the independence of the currency
union’s central bank or telegraphing changes
in policy to markets or possibly to legislatures
prematurely. So, by way of exception, some
such commitments could be provided in
writing confidentially and, in rare cases, orally
to the managing director, with reporting on
a periodic, confidential basis to the board.
Both the Europeans and the executive board
seemed reasonably content with this compromise,
adopted in a “spirit of consensus,” although
a number of executive directors would have
preferred a harder option. But the workability
of the compromise in a severe crisis for a
large country in which union-level policy is
inextricably intertwined with the success
of the program remains to be tested.
One could easily imagine a scenario in which
a country approaches the ECB to activate the
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program,
and the ECB insists that the country accept a
program from the ESM and the IMF together.
ECB President Mario Draghi’s announcement of
the details of OMT in September 2012 specified
that such a country would be expected to go to
43 See Hagan and Bredenkamp (2018); IMF (2018). See, in the latter
(pages 1–4), the summing up of the executive board meeting on
March 16, 2018, which discussed the staff paper.

the IMF. The ECB could reconsider the link, but
has not to date publicly qualified or rescinded
this requirement.44 The Fund could well perceive
the conduct of not only monetary policy but
also banking regulation, private-sector bail-in
during bank rescues and the administration of
EU fiscal rules to be critical to the program, in
which case they could be subject to assurances.
Whether the non-European countries among
the membership accept the firmness of the
assurances and how they are communicated
to the board could, given the stakes involved,
determine the involvement of the Fund.

Future of the IMF in the Euro Area
During the most intense standoff over the third
Greek program, several key creditors began to
rethink their preference for involving the IMF in
rescue programs. French President Emmanuel
Macron said in September 2017 that the IMF had
“no place” in EU affairs and that Europe should
“head toward a European Monetary Fund” (Khan
2017). The European Commission issued its formal
proposal for such an institution and the Euro
Summit placed the subject on its agenda shortly
thereafter.45 Meanwhile, the German coalition
agreement between Chancellor Angela Merkel’s
Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats
aimed to create an EMF.46 The chancellor herself,
in discussing proposals by President Macron,
said, “We also want to become independent from
the International Monetary Fund. The European
Stability Mechanism (ESM), which we created
in the crisis, is to become a European Monetary
Fund, an EMF — with instruments like those
of the IMF” (Gutschker and Lohse 2018).
For its part, the Trump administration is also
raising serious questions about the participation
of the IMF in any further European contingencies.
“All IMF members have a right to the Fund’s
emergency financing,” a spokesperson for the
US Treasury said in October 2018. “However, the
European members have now established their
own emergency financing capability at the EU
and eurozone level and have announced that
they will no longer seek IMF financing in the

event of a crisis” (Fleming and Politi 2018). As a
consequence, this Treasury official argued, the
financial resources of the IMF were sufficient for
the time being, but will have to be evaluated in
the future, in light of the expiration of the bilateral
borrowing agreements and US participation
in the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB).
The assertion that they would “no longer seek
IMF financing” was a surprise to European
officials; none had announced that they would
waive their rights to draw from the Fund in a
crisis. Chancellor Merkel’s statement certainly
could not be construed this way, particularly
since the institutional reforms she advocated
have not been agreed, let alone enacted. But the
statement, if we were to take it seriously, suggests
the current leadership of the US Treasury could
oppose drawings for euro-area member states.
The language of the revised ESM treaty does not
alter the role of the IMF. There remains a formal
presumption that the IMF’s involvement will
be sought and an acknowledgement that its
participation is not strictly necessary, in order
to provide for situations in which the Fund and
the European institutions cannot agree on basic
parameters of a program. On the one hand, this
formulation leaves the door open to repeating
cooperation similar to most of the cases that arose
in the euro crisis, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus.
On the other hand, European and IMF officials
are probably less likely to come to agreement
on programs for highly indebted countries in
the absence of debt restructuring, which could
be problematic for any future contingency
involving Greece or Italy, for example.
Fundamentally, creating a genuine, full-fledged
EMF would be desirable for both Europe and the
rest of the world.47 It would help to complete
the unfinished architecture of the euro area and
could relieve the rest of the world of providing
rescues in crises to which the incompleteness
of the union has contributed. Any decision to
forgo drawings on the IMF would have important
long-term consequences for these institutions.
Among other things, it would greatly strengthen
the case for consolidating member states’
position in the IMF into a single European

44 See ECB (2012). The relevant sentence reads: “The involvement of
the IMF shall also be sought for the design of the country-specific
conditionality and the monitoring of such a programme.”
45 See European Commission (2017b).
46 See www.tagesschau.de/inland/ergebnis-sondierungen-101.pdf, page 5.

47 For a recent analysis, see Kincaid (2019).
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membership, thereby facilitating increases in
the quota shares of faster-growing EMDCs.48
But euro-area member states are not, for the
moment, anywhere close to taking these steps
and are likely to continue to involve the IMF in
one fashion or another in the next set of programs,
whenever such a crisis might come. Putting aside
for the moment the question of whether nonEuropean countries would agree to “supply” the
IMF, Europe’s “demand” for the Fund’s involvement
is likely to endure. Desire on the part of creditor
states to curb “drift” on the part of the European
Commission remains a principal reason for
involving the Fund, ameliorated only in part by
the appointment of a German as Commission
president. Germany can be expected to rely
more heavily on the ESM, in which creditor
states might place greater faith, in the future.
But divergent preferences among member states
lay beneath creditor distrust of institutions in
Europe and this divergence will persist, if not
grow. Moreover, the ESM will continue to make
decisions on financial assistance by unanimity,
under which one creditor state or another is likely
to continue to insist on the IMF’s involvement.
Modest as they might be, the present changes to
the ESM treaty and the package of which they are
a part should be ratified and enacted. The rest of
the world should welcome them as a constructive
contribution to European and global governance
but should also prod the euro area toward further
institutional deepening to place the monetary
union on a permanently stable foundation.

The Evolving IMF
The IMF has not been standing still as the RFAs
have been evolving over the last two decades.
It has instead undertaken numerous reforms
to its lending instruments and guidelines on
conditionality — including the introduction of
the precautionary facilities — and has recently
reviewed its lending framework, relationships
with RFAs and its “tool kit” of financial facilities.
Discontent with the IMF’s participation in the
troika during the sovereign debt crisis of the euro

48 See, among others, Henning (1997; 2006; 2011).
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area was the proximate motive for these reviews
(IEO 2016). But IMF officials were also motivated by
recognition that they are likely to be called upon
to cooperate with financial institutions in other
regions and new lending instruments have been
designed specifically to be palatable to countries
in East Asia, Latin America and elsewhere.
IMF staff wrote and the executive board discussed
a series of papers as part of this effort. It began
with the ex post evaluation of the first program for
Greece, which was released by the Fund in 2013
(IMF 2013b), much to the chagrin of a number of
European officials. The effort continued with papers
on the Fund’s lending framework (IMF 2014; 2015a;
2016a), examined in the section “Dangers and
Remedies”); its approach to crises generally (IMF
2015b); the first half of the euro crisis (IEO 2016);
the GFSN (IMF 2017a); the tool kit (IMF 2017b; 2017c;
2017d; 2017e); and collaboration with the RFAs
(IMF 2017f; 2017g; 2017h). The Fund also conducted
an extended review of its lending to countries in
currency unions, which it published in 2018, as
discussed in the previous section (IMF 2018).
The IMF was guided by two institutional
imperatives in reviewing its relationship with the
RFAs.49 First, while it welcomes the development
of RFAs in general, the Fund wishes to preempt competition over the design of programs.
Competition between the two creditors would
threaten to weaken the conditions attached to
lending. Prospective borrowers might welcome
this, of course, but such competition is likely
to undermine the effectiveness of programs.
Conditionality is difficult enough to establish
on technical grounds; adding competitive
considerations could be severely damaging.
Second, the IMF wishes to avoid the nightmare
scenario in which a region misdiagnoses a crisis,
intervenes poorly and turns to the Fund belatedly.
The upshot of the Fund’s review of collaboration
with the RFAs, as far as how institutions
would cooperate in a crisis contingency
for a country with dual membership is
concerned, was at least four-fold.
First, the IMF executive board approved the
introduction of a new tool, the Policy Coordination

49 On the IMF’s relationship to regional arrangements, see, in addition to
work cited above, Boughton (2012); Rhee, Sumulong and Vallé (2013);
Kawai and Lombardi (2015); Eichengreen and Woods (2016); Cheng
(2016); Medhora (2017); and Roberts, Armijo and Katada (2018).

Instrument (PCI) (IMF 2017e). This instrument
provides a vehicle for member governments to
commit to policies judged to be sound by the
IMF staff, which would monitor compliance over
the course of the agreement. The IMF would not
provide financing, but the instrument can be used
in conjunction with financing from other sources.
The PCI might appear to have been inspired
by the IMF’s experience in the third Greek
program, in which it declined to contribute
financing but participated in the design of
conditionality and monitored implementation
throughout. But countries entering into a PCI
agreement would be expected to satisfy uppercredit tranche conditionality and their debt
would have to be sustainable. The Seychelles
and Serbia have applied for and received PCI
arrangements from the IMF (IMF 2017i).
Eventually, RFAs might develop a sufficient
indigenous capacity to design and monitor
stabilization programs and eliminate the link to
the IMF altogether. Europe possesses the analytical
capability to do so, although it has retained the
IMF for program design and monitoring even when
the Fund has not contributed financing. For the
RFAs beyond Europe, however, developing such a
capacity independently from the Fund would be a
vision that could only be realized in the long term
and one that would not necessarily be shared by
all of these regions’ members. In the meantime,
RFAs could partner with the IMF through use
of the PCI, drawing on the IMF’s comparative
advantage in designing such programs.50
Second, the Fund staff proposed, and the executive
board considered, but did not approve, the creation
of a Short-term Liquidity Swap (SLS) facility at
the IMF. This would be the functional equivalent
of a BSA but provided by the IMF rather than
a central bank. The staff proposal provided for
revolving access, abandoned the expectation
that the country would exit and had low usage
fees. The proposal failed in part because global
financial conditions were benign, and no qualifying
country was willing to sign up as the “first mover.”
But the proposal remains “on the shelf ” and

50 Whether the RFAs accept an arrangement whereby the IMF defines
conditions without contributing financing remains an open question. So
far, ASEAN+3 finance and central bank deputies have not judged PCI to
satisfy the link on the grounds that it is technical assistance rather than a
program in the traditional sense.

could possibly be adopted at a moment when
financial markets become volatile (IMF 2017c).
Such a facility could be attractive for countries in
Latin America, East Asia and Europe and could
disburse in conjunction with disbursements from
the RFAs. Again, the governing bodies of these
RFAs would have to decide that SLS qualification
satisfies their requirement for the link.51
Third, to address members’ concerns about the
use of its precautionary lines, the IMF refined
the qualification framework for the Flexible
Credit Line (FCL) and the PLL in order to make
qualification more predictable. The changes should
also facilitate the alignment of the qualification
criteria of the Fund’s precautionary arrangements
with those of the CMIM and the ESM.
Fourth, and fundamentally, the IMF laid out its
two visions by which it would collaborate with
RFAs in the future — the “lead agency” and the
“coherent program design” models. Where the
IMF’s and RFAs’ capabilities are differentiated,
the two institutions would defer to one another
in their respective areas of comparative
advantage when designing and implementing
programs. The IMF would take the lead on the
macroeconomic framework and policies, for
example, while the RFA could address structural
reform and areas requiring local knowledge.
The coherent program design model would apply in
cases where the overlaps between the capabilities
and mandates of the two institutions are large.
To pre-empt institutional conflict over program
design, and thus avoid inconsistent demands on
the debtor, early engagement to fashion a single
coherent program was called for in those instances
(IMF 2017f, 2, 17, box 3). Officials at the IMF, it would
be fair to surmise, expect to follow the coherent
program design model in European contingencies
and the lead agency model just about everywhere
else. The RFA staff response to the IMF paper raised
the possibility that an RFA might serve as the lead
agency in joint programs (Cheng et al. 2018, 18).
Several authors, including Paul Blustein (2016),
argue that the European institutions did just that
within the troika at the outset of the euro crisis.

51 Proposals that ASEAN+3 accept qualification for IMF precautionary
facilities as satisfying the link go back to the Contingent Credit Line and
the early years of the Chiang Mai Initiative (Henning 2002). The same
pairing concept can be applied to the IMF’s current precautionary
arrangements. See also Volz (2012).
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However, the summing up of the executive board’s
discussion of the Fund paper on collaboration
effectively precludes the IMF deferring to an RFA
as the lead agency in the future (IMF 2017j).
The 2017 IMF paper on the RFAs derived six
principles for interinstitutional cooperation,
which were previewed in the section “Debate
over Financial Governance” and Box 2. These
effectively supplanted the G20 principles of 2011
(see Box 1).52 Reflecting the experience accumulated
during the interim, the IMF’s principles are
more pointed and operationally relevant than
the G20 principles. Because the Fund consulted
with all of the RFAs in developing them, the IMF
principles better relate to arrangements that
do not have member countries in the G20.53
The IMF paper is remarkable as an effort
to establish the road map for institutional
cooperation. It serves to orient and conceptualize
the interinstitutional discourse. But it must be
said that the IMF principles, even though they
were endorsed by the executive board, engage
the institutions more than they do the member
states. Member state preferences will be a source
of entropy; it would be remarkable, indeed
a minor miracle, if the major players in key
national governments “stayed in their lanes.”
Finally, it should be noted that, although the IMF
implemented a reform and quota increase in 2016,
the resources that are available to it are under
renegotiation. At the moment, the IMF’s resources
amount to about $1.34 trillion, split roughly evenly
between quota contributions and borrowing
arrangements with its members. Of the borrowing
arrangements, $250 billion comes from the NAB and
$440 billion comes from bilateral agreements. But,
unless they are renewed, the bilateral agreements
will expire by the end of 2020 and the NAB will
lapse in November 2022 (Truman 2018a). IMF
members have agreed in principle to maintain the
current level of resources and to discuss a doubling
of the NAB (IMF 2019b), but US Treasury Secretary
Steven Mnuchin refused an increase in quotas
during the fifteenth review (US Treasury 2019).
The United States has a particular responsibility
to protect the readiness and vitality of the IMF.
52 See IMF (2017f, 18-19, 36-37); G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors (2011).
53 RFA feedback on the principles is provided in Cheng et al. (2018,
16–18).
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Such responsibility derives not only from the
country’s status as the largest shareholder and
host to the headquarters of the institution, but
also from the dominant role of the US dollar as an
international currency and a determinant of global
financial conditions. The United States routinely
deflects to the IMF requests for financial assistance
from countries that have liberalized the capital
account and subsequently suffer from volatile
outflows. Support for the IMF should be the logical
counterpart to US strategic interest in open global
financial markets. The prospect that the IMF might
be underfunded for the next crisis — whether
owing to obstinance on the part of the United States
or other key members — motivates some EMDCs
to consider regional alternatives to the Fund.

Dangers and Remedies
Having reviewed the state of play within the
institutions, this report will now consider
the dangers associated with having multiple,
overlapping institutions in the crisis-finance
space. Nine of them are examined in this
section: complementarity and competition,
compatibility of instruments, moral hazard,
private-sector capture, secretariat autonomy,
institutional principles, conflict resolution,
preferred creditor status and transparency.

Complementarity and
Competition
Commentary on the safety net (including some of
this author’s) routinely advocates that RFAs and the
IMF specialize along the lines of the comparative
advantage of the institutions. Scholars usually
attribute comparative advantage in macroeconomic
policy, exchange rates and balance-of-payments
analysis to the IMF. Regional institutions are
deemed to hold a comparative advantage in select
areas of structural policy, microprudential financial
regulation, local financial markets and political
circumstances within the borrowing member
country. From a functionalist standpoint, such a
division of labour would conserve resources, avoid
duplication and provide more complete coverage
of the surveillance waterfront — all of which are
particularly important considerations when the
resources devoted to surveillance are scarce.

But in this general recommendation lies a
fundamental dilemma. Although international
economists prize bureaucratic efficiency, the
governments that constitute the institutions have
other objectives as well. States in Europe, East
Asia and Latin America have also created RFAs as
alternatives to the IMF to avoid monopolization of
surveillance and crisis finance on the part of the
global multilateral institution. The comparative
advantage model leaves member states dependent
on each institution for its field of primary
competence; the model does not allow for
alternative views and analysis of the same problem.
Nor does it allow states to pick and choose among
the surveillance products with which they are
presented or allow them to play one institution
off against the other. The latter dynamic might
yield suboptimal outcomes substantively, but
functional overlap exists because states design
institutions to give themselves more, rather than
fewer, options. For this reason, the international
financial institutions have manifestly not evolved
along the comparative advantage model.
The dilemma between substantive efficiency and
political control manifests in debates over the
future direction of each of the institutions. AMRO,
for example, wants to show value added to its
members over what is already available through
surveillance analysis at the IMF, the ADB and
ASEAN, among other international organizations.
With a total annual budget of about $19 million, its
choice of specialization is strategically important
for the institution and potentially relevant to
future grants of authority from member states.
A specialization strategy would recommend
developing a comparative advantage in the microfoundations of financial markets, structural policy
and emergent topics in which the other institutions
have not yet built capacity, such as fintech and its
consequences for market stability and financial
regulation. Given the budget constraint, however,
developing these capabilities would mean forgoing
capabilities in macroeconomic analysis, debt
sustainability and policy conditionality. It would
mean, in other words, compromising the ambition
to effectively weigh in on the design of country
programs with the IMF — an ambition that has
motivated support for the project from Southeast
Asian countries from its inception. Accordingly,
AMRO has chosen to develop capacity in areas
that significantly overlap those of the IMF in
macroeconomic analysis, financial vulnerability and

spillover, and has adopted the style of the Fund’s
Article IV reports in its surveillance publications.
The European institutions, with more resources
at their disposal, are developing with an even
greater degree of overlap with the Fund.
While there is considerable discussion within
Europe about the relative competences of
the ESM, the European Commission and the
ECB, and how they should evolve, developing
complementarities with the IMF is not a priority.
On the contrary, European authorities have
designed euro-area lending capabilities to be
deployable in circumstances in which the IMF
might be unable or unwilling to participate.
We are left with a tension between developing
complementary or potentially competing capacity
in the RFAs that, while manageable, is persistent.
But there is an important difference between the
areas of program design and conditionality, on the
one hand, and economic analysis and surveillance,
on the other. Whereas competition in the former
can undermine programs, competition among
the RFAs and the Fund in surveillance can benefit
member states, notwithstanding the stress it
might place on secretariats. By providing a broader
range of methods, models and forecasts, for
example, competition permits states to compare
and evaluate analysis, avoiding groupthink on the
part of a single institution.54 There is, of course,
the danger that competing recommendations
will dilute the impact of advice that institutions
convey in bilateral surveillance, but there is also
the possibility that, when institutions happen
to agree, they reinforce one another and induce
greater corrective action in member states.
As a general matter, international organizations
often sponsor, nurture or even create other
institutions that help them advance their
missions.55 The IMF has done the same in a number
of circumstances. The most consequential case
has probably been the Fund’s intellectual and
analytical support for institutional and economic
deepening of the monetary union in Europe
— completing Europe’s monetary union could
potentially put the IMF “out of business” in the

54 On institutional competition in the euro crisis, see Henning (2017, 2627, 241, 246-47). On the implication of different types of spillover on
institutional cooperation, see Johnson and Urpelainen (2012).
55 See, relatedly, Johnson (2014) and Abbott et al. (2015).
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euro area, but the institution has intellectually
supported such deepening nonetheless.
Similarly, the IMF has been called upon to
support the RFAs’ capacity building through
training, technical assistance, joint meetings and
conferences, joint country missions and staff
exchanges. How should the IMF answer this
call? The question poses a dilemma for the Fund.
On the one hand, it has an institutional interest
in developing sophisticated, like-minded and
compatible partners in the regional institutions,
and training and capacity development is one
way to foster these. On the other hand, the
Fund has little interest bureaucratically in
empowering institutional competitors, which is
the purpose for which some advocate the RFAs.
As a practical matter, the dilemma will ultimately
be resolved by the preferences of key member
states. When the leading creditor countries in the
Fund and region favour IMF support for the RFA,
the Fund can be expected to provide it, as was the
case with IMF support for European deepening.
The answer thus hinges on the preferences of
linchpin countries, those that lead the region
and are influential within the Fund — Germany
and France, China and Japan, and Brazil and
Mexico.56 The United States, while influential in
other respects, is not a linchpin country because
it does not straddle the Fund and these regions.57

Compatibility of Instruments
Even if institutions wish to preserve the option
of operating independently, their lending
instruments should be designed to work together
in those situations where cooperation is needed
or desirable. There are several ways in which such
technical complementarity can be encouraged
and incompatibilities pre-empted. These relate
to the design features of the lending windows,
standards of qualification and evaluation processes.
The Fund’s engagement with ASEAN+3 over the test
runs for CMIM revealed several incompatibilities.
ASEAN+3 has adjusted the terms of the CMIMSF to more closely match those of the Fund’s
SBA, which demonstrates a certain amount of

56 On the roles of large emerging-market countries in financial governance,
see Kahler (2013; 2016), Lombardi and Wang (2015); Henning and
Walter (2016); Helleiner (2017).
57 Except insofar as it maintains the North American Framework Agreement
and could utilize or expand that agreement in the future.
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alacrity and responsiveness. The IMF has designed
several of its facilities specifically to be able to
join them with facilities of other institutions,
the PCI being a case in point. European officials
should be mindful of interoperability as they
introduce enhancements of the ESM and consider
operationalization of the ECB’s outright monetary
transactions. Having shown their value in
highlighting points of friction among instruments
and decision-making procedures in East Asia,
test runs should be employed to identify and
“debug” similar incompatibilities between the
lending instruments of other RFAs and the IMF. The
institutions should review their instruments on an
ongoing basis with an eye toward compatibility.
Precautionary arrangements offer another
opportunity for institutional synergy. Confusion
could arise if institutions apply different criteria
for qualification for such facilities, which could
undermine market confidence and thus be selfdefeating. Care should be taken to align the
criteria and evaluate them similarly. Because the
IMF is most advanced in this respect, alignment
effectively means convergence on the Fund’s
precautionary framework (IMF 2017b).
Precautionary instruments create a substantial
burden on secretariats to monitor and evaluate
economic policies of potential applicants. Several
RFAs are in the process of developing such
capacities. But until their surveillance is robust and
independent, RFAs can link to the IMF for ex ante
qualification for precautionary arrangements. RFAs
should accept the IMF’s qualification of members
for an FCL as sufficient for qualifying their own
members for precautionary arrangements from
within the region. The same principle would apply
to PLL qualification at the Fund and regional
precautionary windows with lower thresholds.
Both regular qualification as it is now practised for
the FCL and pre-qualification as has been proposed
should qualify members for regional precautionary
lines (IMF 2010; Truman 2010; Rajan 2014).58
Any RFA that does develop its own capacity in this
respect will want to align its qualification criteria
with those of the IMF’s precautionary lines — if it
envisions joint qualification at the two institutions.
Some RFAs might resist doing so if they believe that
the Fund’s criteria are too strict. But if they decline
to align the criteria, they would have to be prepared

58 See also Birdsall, Rojas-Suarez and Diofasi (2017).

to provide full precautionary coverage for a country
that meets the lower regional threshold but fails
to meet the Fund’s, which could be quite large.

through the financial markets and, in the case of
predatory hedge funds, for example, have shown
themselves to be adept at gaming the institutions.

The SLS was neither adopted nor rejected by
the executive board of the IMF in early 2017. It
could, in principle, be revived in the future,59
especially if needed in a crisis. Regional facilities
should prepare for that contingency and consider
how, whether and on what terms to mobilize
their own liquidity provision along with it.

Until now, the institutions, to the extent that
they have responded to the moral hazard threat,
have done so more or less independently. The
IMF’s lending framework, like self-commitment
devices in other contexts, uses institutional rules
to pre-empt temptation in the midst of crises to
deploy financing with insufficient adjustment
or inadequate debt restructuring in order to
combat systemic financial disruption. Of course,
the protection against moral hazard is imperfect,
insofar as the governing bodies that adopt the
rules can change them in a crisis. But these rules
nonetheless raise the cost of bailing out excessive
lending and letting off “guilty” private creditors.

Qualification for the FCL at the Fund can also be
linked to BSAs.60 Countries that qualify for an FCL
under the criteria used by the IMF and establish
an FCL agreement should be eligible for swap
agreements with key-currency central banks. This
proposal could open up access to central bank
swaps to a limited but still significant number of
countries that do not now have access to them.61
Key-currency central banks would not be legally
compelled to provide swaps, but there should be a
normative presumption that FCL qualifiers would
receive them and governors who refuse should have
to justify their decision in closed-door meetings
with their peers. Countries that do not qualify
for an FCL — which describes all six advanced
countries in the permanent swap network — should
not be barred from swaps from central banks
that are willing to provide them (Henning 2015).

Moral Hazard
The regime complex for crisis finance must avoid
allowing the institutions to be picked apart by
financial markets, states or other actors when they
finance programs jointly. The problem arises at
multiple stages of a crisis and rescue: the debtaccumulation phase, the choice of institutional
arrangements, design of the program, periodic
post-disbursement review and repayment. We
can expect the problem to be aggravated by
institutional competition and a multiplicity of
financial facilities operating in the crisis rescue
space. The problem goes beyond mere forum
shopping on the part of borrowers; private
actors sometimes coordinate their movements

59 The Geneva Report, for example, proposed a more robust variant of the
SLS proposal.
60 On central bank swap agreements, see, among others, Prasad (2017);
McDowell (2017); Sheets, Truman and Lowery (2018); and Eichengreen,
Lombardi and Malkin (2018).
61 For similar or related proposals, see Truman (2010), Rajan (2014),
Henning (2015) and Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer (2017).

Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer (2017) have led
the charge against moral hazard in the context
of the RFAs and their interaction with the IMF.
Informed primarily by the European case, and the
experience with the Greek program in particular,
they worry that the multiple sources of financing in
the expanded GFSN provide incentives for markets
and governments to accumulate excessive debt ex
ante and provide soft financing ex post. (Financing is
“soft” when the adjustment is insufficient to restore
access to private markets or debt restructuring is
insufficient to ensure sustainability.) They examine
alternative strategies for using the institutions as
commitment devices to constrain the temptation
to soften the terms of financing in a crisis.
Scrutinizing the troika programs for Greece,
the authors are critical of the European RFA for
migrating from a hard lender of last resort to a
provider of soft financing. In their interpretation,
the IMF was included in the troika arrangement
as just such a device, to anchor the programs in
realism with respect to debt restructuring. But it
failed to serve this role, in their view. They conclude
that “using the IMF as a commitment device may
not be a reliable, politically viable option for an
RFA — even for an arrangement that builds this
commitment device into its charter and is keen to
make it work” (Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer
2017, 31-32). When the IMF dug in its heels on debt
sustainability for Greece during the negotiations
over the third program, the European institutions
abandoned the anchor and lent to Greece anyway.
Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer raise this
warning in part because they were concerned
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about the shift in the IMF lending framework in
the wake of changes in its Exceptional Access
Policy (EAP) in early 2016. Along with revoking
the systemic exemption, the Fund introduced
a new category between the two cases of debt
being either clearly sustainable or clearly
unsustainable. In cases of uncertainty about
sustainability, the so-called “gray zone,” one of
two things would have to happen before the
IMF could grant exceptional access. Either there
would be a definitive debt restructuring or other
lenders would provide concessional finance
that improves the prospects for sustainability
and safeguards IMF resources (IMF 2015a, 9).

including conducting their own DSAs. The time was
ripe for the non-European RFAs to develop such
frameworks, they wrote in 2017, while debt was
relatively low and it was still possible to pre-empt
excessive accumulation. Such a solution would
inevitably involve the RFAs defining their own
policy conditionality in cases of both sustainability
and reprofiling. If RFAs were to take the Weder di
Mauro and Zettelmeyer advice, in other words,
they would be well on their way to becoming
regional monetary funds in their own right.

The provision was intended to address
European complaints that the Fund was too
inflexible and unwilling to grant access when
the European institutions were effectively
underpinning sustainability through their longterm commitments to members of the euro
area. By creating the gray zone, some euro-area
countries could draw on the Fund insofar as the
European institutions were willing to provide
the bulk of financing on concessional terms.
The provision would also have the felicitous
by-product of allowing the Fund to avoid risk
associated with lending into cases of dubious
sustainability in conjunction with RFAs while
alleviating tension between the diversity among
them, on the one hand, and the equal-treatment
provisions of the IMF, on the other. To the extent
that programs were custom fit to the preferences
of the region, the RFAs themselves would
provide the element of variation, not the Fund.

First, the review conducted here of the recent
developments among the RFAs suggests that
risks of moral hazard vary substantially among
the regional facilities according to their degree
of development. The European arrangements
are most prone to moral hazard on the part of
sovereign borrowers and private banks and
investors, owing to the size of the ESM and
the demonstrated willingness of members to
deploy it. But the ASEAN+3 and Latin American
institutions are a different matter: the CMIM has
never been used and will have very little credibility
with markets until it is activated. Given its lack
of visibility, it is not plausible that the CMIM’s
mere existence could be encouraging excessive
lending. Relative to the CMIM, FLAR has been
quite active and several of its loans have gone
to countries whose adjustment has been partial
rather than complete. But any contribution that
FLAR might make to ex ante moral hazard would
be constrained by its relatively small size.

But Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer (2017)
perceptively point out that the change interacts
with the IMF link on the part of RFAs in an
unanticipated way (see pages 40–42 as well).
By allowing an RFA to contribute additional
financing in cases of uncertain sustainability,
the new EAP weakens, if not eviscerates, the
value of the IMF link as a safeguard against
moral hazard in this particular form.62
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By way of evaluation, there are several points to
make about this important set of arguments.

Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer’s solution to this
problem is for RFAs to develop their own lending
frameworks and exceptional access policies,

Second, granularity provided in this review helps
to discern the different ways in which moral hazard
is and is not a threat. Newer, smaller RFAs are not
likely to induce excessive risk taking ex ante, but
they could be ensnared in soft lending for bailouts
ex post. Also, if smaller RFAs were to move outward
along a trajectory toward more fully fledged
regional monetary funds, they would then need
safeguards against lending into situations where
debt is unsustainable. Doing so would naturally
be facilitated by greater progress in developing an
international sovereign debt restructuring regime.63

62 Somewhat ironically, the change does not satisfy some other Europeans,
who are concerned that the ESM and other European institutions would
end up shouldering most or all of the risk of these operations as a
consequence. This concern is hinted at, although implicitly, in the RFA staff
paper by Gong Cheng et al. (2018).

63 Space requires that SDRM regimes be left for treatment elsewhere. See,
for example, Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform
(2013).
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Third, if the ESM were enhanced and ever delinked
from the IMF, it would definitely need to be given
stronger safeguards than are now envisioned.64
For this reason, the ambiguity within European
arrangements with respect to the involvement of
the IMF should be worrisome. It is understandable
that Europeans would not want to give the Fund
a veto over assistance to members of the euro
area. But proceeding to a program on a Europeonly basis without such a framework in place
would be potentially dangerous. European officials
should prioritize the further development of
regional arrangements for debt restructuring in
future deliberations over the architecture of the
euro area if they wish to keep open the option of
developing programs independently from the IMF.
Fourth, if RFAs develop lending frameworks to
control moral hazard, the consistency of their
frameworks with that of the Fund becomes a
serious question. If RFAs were to simply copy the
Fund’s EAP, there would be little conflict. But they
would probably not embark on this course, as
opposed to simply using the Fund as the anchor,
unless they wanted a different framework, in which
case the flashpoints between them and the Fund
would multiply. (The lead-agency model would
probably not be feasible in such circumstances.) If
RFAs adopt such lending frameworks, therefore,
they should be prepared to go their own way
— as the European institutions did when they
encountered irreconcilable differences with the
IMF on the DSA for the third Greek program. At
this point in time, however, a significant number
of euro-area officials still prefer to avoid this course
and the RFAs outside Europe are not equipped
to address a large-scale crisis independently.

Capture
Institutional overlap also gives rise to multiple
avenues for private capture of official institutions
and the processes by which decisions on financial
assistance are made, as it does with respect to
moral hazard.65 Private creditors are sometimes
well placed to cajole, influence or threaten
officials in order to manipulate the complex of
institutions to their advantage — by, among other
means, holding “innocent bystanders” hostage
for bailouts. Those responsible for designing

64 A warning sounded by Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer (2017).
65 Capture can occur even when excessive risk taking is not involved and so,
while related, is conceptually distinct from moral hazard.

financial rescues should be alert to the possibility
that, as one institution erects safeguards against
abuse (such as the IMF’s lending framework and
reprofiling requirements), private or official lenders
who have lent imprudently simply exploit other
institutions in the safety net. The design of the
safety net should pre-empt the circumvention of
safeguards against capture and moral hazard.
Governance is critically important to
understanding the risk of capture and moral
hazard. These risks do not arise simply owing
to regulation and the structure of markets; they
inhere also in how institutions make decisions,
the reversibility of self-commitment and the
avenues for private manipulation. The close
connection between governance, on the one
hand, and moral hazard and capture, on the
other, gives rise to three further observations.
First, because the influence of different regions
varies within the IMF, that institution provides
better defence against capture and moral hazard for
some regions than others. The Fund’s commitment
to requiring that private creditors reprofile debt in
cases of unsustainability will be stronger and more
credible for regions that have lesser voting strength
within the executive board. Self-commitment is
more difficult and time inconsistency a greater
danger in the case of Europe, because that region
can use its greater voting strength to nudge
the institution to back off from strong antibailout commitments that are taken ex ante.
Second, it follows that the IMF’s effectiveness as
an anchor against moral hazard will change as the
weight of countries and their regions change over
time in the quota and voting structure of the Fund.
Specifically, as voting shares shift from Europe
to the EMDCs, the IMF can be expected to be a
stronger anchor for contingencies in Europe. But
the shift will have the unintended consequence of
making it a weaker anchor for those regions with
growing shares, especially East Asia and South
Asia. While the quota and voting structure of the
Fund should certainly be made more representative
of countries’ actual weight in the global economy
and finance, this problem should be anticipated.
The IMF is certainly susceptible to heavy
influence on the part of large shareholders
such as the United States, China and European
members. Nonetheless, third, the Fund on the
whole is likely to provide better defence against
capture and moral hazard than RFAs, for several
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reasons. The IMF’s universal membership makes
it more expensive to capture than regional
institutions. While changes to its articles require a
supermajority, no single country can veto lending
decisions or thus hold the institution hostage over
individual programs. Compared to the regional
arrangements, decision making at the IMF is
more “distant” from the politics within member
states. A liability in terms of responsiveness
and legitimacy, such remoteness can be an
asset in resisting narrow, private interests. The
Fund’s value as an anchor is not obsolete.

Institutional Independence
Inspired by the example of central bank
independence, the Geneva Report proposes
granting the IMF staff operational autonomy
in the design of programs and disbursement of
financial assistance. The executive board could
thereby be disbanded and replaced by a more
senior-level non-resident body meeting six to
eight times a year, to which management would
be accountable. The proposal is important in
the context of this particular analysis because
the Fund’s organizational arrangements
have informed the development of RFAs and
changes in the Fund’s organizational structure
would affect its interaction with other IFIs.
Because the word “independence” is used in a
variety of ways in global governance discourse,
its meaning in this essay should be precise: the
autonomy with which staff and management
make decisions, conduct operations and pursue
the objectives of the institution — specifically,
their autonomy from direction or influence on
the part of the governments of member states.
Under the proposal offered by the Geneva Report
(de Gregorio et al. 2018, 72-73), Fund management
would be operationally independent, while its goals
would be set in an amendment to the Articles of
Agreement and a new, non-resident board would
oversee performance relative to those goals.66
The report’s case for applying the central bank
independence model rests on time inconsistency
(going back to Kydland and Prescott 1977) and
political capture. Barry Eichengreen argues that
the IMF also suffers from time inconsistency
with respect to lending to countries whose debt
is not sustainable (de Gregorio et al. 2018, 89).
66 The distinction between goal and instrument independence is a feature of
the Bank of England (Tucker 2018).
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It might declare ex ante that it will not do so,
but, when push comes to shove, it proves to be
susceptible to pleas from executive directors
whose countries are suffering from contagion in
anticipation of default or restructuring. The first
Greek program is offered as a paradigmatic case.
Discussion of the proposal focused on the
appropriateness of the central banking model to
crisis finance.67 The IMF’s own IEO produced an
update of a previous report on Fund governance
at about the same time that the Geneva Report
was published (IEO 2008 and 2018). The IEO
was reasonably satisfied by the effectiveness
and efficiency of IMF governance but concluded
that continuing problems of accountability and
voice could weaken the Fund’s legitimacy and,
eventually, effectiveness. Its director, Charles
Collyns (2018), expressed concern that distancing
program approval and lending decisions from
national governments, as the Geneva Report
recommended, would further weaken the Fund’s
accountability and legitimacy, not strengthen them.
The EPG report takes a nuanced view on governance
within the international financial institutions.
Analyzing the budgets of the executive boards
and frequency of meetings, the group generally
advocated greater delegation to management
depending on the level of risk involved in the
decision. The boards themselves should focus
on strategic priorities for the institution and on
holding management to account for advancing
them. But, in the case of the IMF, “surveillance
and lending programs may involve broader
considerations that require Board discussion”
(G20 EPG 2018, 73–75; in particular footnote 83).
So, how should architects of financial institutions
weigh these competing arguments? This study
agrees that reform of the executive board would be
desirable but takes the view that it should retain
political responsibility for program approvals.
This is for two reasons, one that is reasonably
familiar to analysis of financial crises, another
that arises only in the context of institutional
complexity and is thus relatively novel.
First, the distinction between liquidity provision
and risk-bearing crisis finance bears on the choice
of location of lending decisions. Central banks

67 In the Geneva Report, see Jeffry Frieden’s comments about political
constraints (de Gregorio et al. 2018, 79–81) and responses by Jean
Pierre Landau and Takatoshi Ito (ibid., 81–83, 88).

provide liquidity for solvent institutions on good
collateral and thus avoid, or in principle seek
to avoid, financial losses that have fiscal, and
thus distributive, effects. When banks need to
be recapitalized, or when sovereigns need to be
rescued, governments should carry the burden,
because it comes with serious risk of fiscal losses
even when rescues are ultimately successful.
(The “broadening” of central banking since the
global financial crisis involves accepting greater
risk, but arrangements in Britain and the United
States placed a significant amount of it on the
shoulders of governments as the central banks
provided liquidity. Likewise, the profits from
risk bearing also rightly belong to governments.)
This division of labour keeps decisions that have
potential fiscal consequences close to national
legislatures with democratic accountability.
Decisions of the IMF mobilize tens of billions
of dollars in some cases and have political
consequences that can be far-reaching, even
when there is no fiscal cost involved. Realistically,
given the magnitude of the political costs
and benefits, it is hard to see governments
delegating these decisions to a team led by the
managing director. Nor is it likely that such a
team, if given such autonomy, could keep it
through a severe crisis. To see why, consider
again the case of the first Greek program.

the authority to design and approve the program.68
The staff ’s DSA shows that Greece does not meet
the sustainability criteria defined in the EAP
and the managing director thus requires private
banks to write off a large portion of debt prior to
committing IMF resources. Let us also assume,
perhaps even less plausibly, that the European
countries choose to act in solidarity by declining to
lend until a restructuring of private debt is agreed.
Under this scenario, the decision of the managing
director would trigger large losses in financial
markets and private banks, hardship for at least
some “innocent bystanders,” and even perhaps a
recession in some countries. We can hope that a
second Lehman would be smaller than the first.
By acting proactively, the managing director
could be doing the global system a favour in
this respect. Moreover, these losses would not
of course be her fault; they were baked into the
myopic decisions of myriad banks and investors
during the buildup of excessive debt.69
However, even if the scenario is ultimately
less costly than would otherwise be the case,
it matters who triggers the losses. Many national
governments would be delighted to shed the
political responsibility for either triggering the
crisis or bearing the costs of financial rescues.
But the managing director would not withstand
the political blowback alone and political support
within member countries for the IMF would be, at
a minimum, severely damaged. A wise managing
director would insist that member states stand with
her, taking political responsibility before the public,
on a decision of such consequence, whether it is to
force a restructuring or kick the can down the road.

The EAP of the Fund that was in effect prior to the
program required a debt reprofiling or restructuring
as a condition for IMF assistance, because the staff
was not willing to certify Greece as sustainable
with high probability. The provision was suspended
for cases that threatened the stability of the
financial system more broadly — the “systemic
exemption” — at the eleventh hour in the same
meeting of the executive board that approved
the program. Note that the Fund staff, while
under considerable pressure, refused to say that
debt was sustainable with high probability. Staff
maintained its analytical independence; it was not
bowled over by politically motivated members.
It was the executive board that took the political
decision to lend and, if necessary, seek debt
restructuring after the fact, knowing that many
(irresponsible) creditors would “escape” in the
meantime. The executive directors held their nose
and approved the program because they feared
provoking a “second Lehman” if they rejected it.

68 Further assume that the managing director was not personally
predisposed to intervene, as was Dominique Strauss-Kahn.

Now, let us rerun the scenario under the
assumption that the managing director exercises

69 Matters would be different with a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
in place that reduces the cost of such operations. But, of course, we
cannot assume that to be the case.

The second reason to keep consequential, riskbearing financial decisions of the IMF in the hands
of a body that is constituted by political authorities
of the member states stems from the relationships
among institutions in a complex like the GFSN.
We see from the euro crisis that the member
states mediated conflicts among the institutions
in the troika when those conflicts became severe.
They are empowered to do so in part because of
the formal and informal influence that they hold
in the institutions’ governing bodies (Henning
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2017). We also find that, in general, discretion in
international financial institutions is concentrated
at the top, in the executive boards, whereas staff
is constrained by rules. If exceptions are to be
made, the large member states with sway within
the institution want to be distributing the benefits
that stem from doing so. When institutions work
together, secretariats cooperating alone, being less
flexible, are prone to impasses that are likely to
require the intercession of key states to overcome.
Granting operational autonomy to secretariats
would weaken the informal mediating role of states
that are represented on the board. Institutional
conflict would be more difficult to resolve, unless
some alternative mechanism were created.
In sum, responsibilities should be defined in
the following way: The staff and management
of the international financial institutions, the
RFAs and the IMF alike, should be granted full
autonomy in the technical and analytical functions
underpinning surveillance, program design,
policy conditionality, DSA, and monitoring and
assessment of program implementation on the
part of the borrower. The integrity of the analysis,
including the macroeconomic consequences
of policy adjustments in borrowing countries,
should be absolute, or at least as insulated as
possible. But program approvals, being inescapably
political, should be the province of a board with
political responsibility. It would be difficult, if
not impossible, for the board to enforce overall
performance goals without approval authority
for individual programs, moreover. Aside
from aligning competence with risk bearing
and breadth of consequence, this division of
responsibility provides greater latitude for key
members to mediate compromises among the
institutions when that becomes necessary.

Principles for Institutional
Cooperation
The IMF’s six principles of 2017 effectively supplant
the G20 principles of 2011 and provide guidance
that is somewhat more operational. But the IMF
principles primarily address the Fund and its
peer institutions, as opposed to the behaviour
and policies of governments.70 They are thus not
a substitute for principles that are adopted by,
and thus obligate, member states directly. It is

70 The ECB’s IRC Taskforce (2018) offers specific ways to develop the G20
principles on the basis of dialogue between the IMF and RFAs.
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the member states that circumvent or support
the institutions and mediate interinstitutional
conflict. Securing their adherence would constrain
forum shopping, transparency arbitrage and so
forth, and thus heavily influence the quality of
institutional cooperation. Countries themselves, in
particular the linchpin countries straddling the IMF
and the regional arrangements, should therefore
commit to the new principles directly, for which
the G20 would again be an appropriate forum.

Conflict Resolution
How are conflicts among the institutions that
are called upon to cooperate in the GFSN to be
reconciled? The EPG Report (G20 EPG 2018, 72)
advocates vigorous dialogue among the RFAs and
the IMF to facilitate cooperation but otherwise
offers little guidance on this particular question.
The Geneva Report, on the other hand, proposes
binding arbitration of disputes by a three-person
panel chaired by a neutral expert, a procedure
modelled on investment dispute resolution. Its
authors suggest that such a procedure would
have been helpful in resolving the disagreement
between the IMF and European institutions over
Greek debt sustainability in spring 2010. Arbitrators
would need to have access to specialized experts
and produce a settlement quickly, within the
compressed time horizon of program negotiations.
The Fund itself has taken the view that formal
dispute resolution would be “counterproductive,”
and any binding mechanism would run afoul of
the principle that decisions must comply with
each institution’s own policies and governance
structures (which it calls the “independence
principle”). Institutions must seek coherent
program design while respecting differences
among them with respect to lending practices.
This way, if institutions cannot agree, which the
Fund expects to be rare, the member state can
borrow from one of them alone (IMF 2017f, 26).
Which of the two is the better path? Understanding
how interinstitutional conflict was resolved in the
leading case of interaction between the Fund and
regional institutions, the euro crisis, is helpful in
answering this question. Informal mechanisms
were essential for resolving interinstitutional
conflict during those programs. Time and again,
interinstitutional deadlock was resolved by the
mediation of key member states — sometimes the
Group of Seven (G7) finance ministers, sometimes
the German chancellor, and so forth. Because

mediation serves to maintain key-state control
over program design, states tend to underinvest
in mechanisms that might otherwise anticipate
and resolve institutional conflict ex ante.
This central observation leads to two important
conclusions. First, mechanisms of ex ante
coordination of intergovernmental institutions are
rarely if ever going to satisfy architects who take
a functionalist approach to the design of regime
complexes. Second, informalism is thus one of
those parameters within which we must design
mechanisms to resolve conflicts among institutions.
When designing institutions and bringing them
together in a mix such as that for the euro-crisis
programs, the mechanisms of informal coordination
by member states should be nurtured rather than
expunged because they operate in the shadows.71
Space can be created for informalism even within
the formal provisions of institutions, legitimizing
member-state mediation when institutions are
deadlocked. Informal mediation can be brought
into the open, at least in substantial measure,
by announcing meetings and consultations and
providing greater disclosure of their results.
The effectiveness of informal mediation of
institutional disputes by key states depends, in
turn, on a convergence of preferences among
them. Coordination worked satisfactorily enough
from the standpoint of the European creditor
states over the course of the crisis programs. But
the robustness of this model for mediation is
vulnerable to changes in governments, leaders and
ministers. As the Trump administration launches
one dispute after another with long-standing US
partners, trade and foreign policy disputes could
spill over into financial cooperation. We can work
to make coordination robust to changes in state
preferences, by facilitating staff-level resolution,
but there will be limits to accomplishing this in
intergovernmental institutions such as these.
Consider, finally, informal mediation in light of
the movement to accommodate emerging-market
countries in global institutions. The convention
under which the managing director of the IMF
has always been a European, while anachronistic,

71 The legitimacy of back-channel mediation is admittedly vulnerable without
better transparency and communication. Officials from countries outside
the euro area and the G7 criticized the shallowness of staff consultation
with the executive board early in the euro crisis, for example (de Las
Casas 2016).

greatly facilitates informal coordination between
the Fund and the European institutions.
Appointing a non-European to lead the Fund
might strengthen the Fund’s relationship with
institutions in Asia, Africa or Latin America, but
it would likely have the unintended consequence
of weakening informal cooperation with Europe.
Thus, while the Bretton Woods institutions should
discard the convention, new channels would
have to be created in order to avoid deterioration
in cooperation with European institutions.

Preferred Creditor Status
Any situation that involves multiple lenders poses
the question of creditor seniority, that is, the
hierarchy in which creditors are repaid when the
debtor cannot make good on its commitments to
all of them. The IMF has traditionally claimed and
been accorded the status of preferred creditor,
at the apex of the hierarchy. This status has been
established as a matter of customary law through
successive debt workouts over the decades.72 But,
because it is not explicitly stated in the Fund’s
Articles of Agreement, the status is questioned
from time to time and defenders of the Fund
take pains to reinforce it on an ongoing basis.
The challenges have come from somewhat
surprising quarters, including people who have
formerly worked at the Fund or been closely
involved in international finance. During the
European debt crisis, some officials questioned
the seniority of the Fund when they were being
asked for official sector involvement.73 Susan
Schadler (2013, and especially 2014) argued that
the case for preferred status for the IMF rested
on the Fund’s lending policies and that the first
Greek program, adopted along with the “systemic
exemption,” undermined that case. Preferred
creditor status inevitably creates moral hazard on
the part of the Fund, she argued, weakening the
incentive to be vigilant when lending to countries
whose debt sustainability was dubious. By having
“skin in the game,” as some Europeans liked to
say during the euro crisis, the IMF would face
a more balanced set of incentives and lend less
liberally. With changes to the lending framework
of the Fund in 2016, the systemic exemption was
revoked, in part to address such concerns.

72 See Martha (1990; 2015, chapter 50) and Lastra (2014).
73 See, for example, Spink (2013), cited by Schadler (2014).
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Of course, the IMF’s status might also be
challenged by other international organizations
that are similarly exposed in a restructuring.
That could potentially include the RFAs, although
it is important to point out that the ESM has
indicated that it would defer to the IMF, while
it claims seniority over all other creditors.
Accordingly, both the G20 principles and the
IMF’s six principles state clearly that the IMF
should be accorded preferred creditor status.
There are several good reasons for treating the IMF
as the preferred creditor, senior even to the RFAs.
To condense a broad-ranging argument, the IMF is
available, in principle, for all sovereign borrowers,
takes on the most difficult cases and thus carries
a high-risk portfolio. Its responsibilities in these
respects, moreover, are fundamental to maintaining
the stability of the international financial system
as a whole. If a regional arrangement attempts but
fails to treat a crisis on its own, the problem will
migrate to the global multilateral institution, in this
sense a lender of last resort. If the IMF is to remain
at the “centre” of the global safety net, states that
contribute to it must know that their financial
support is not subordinate to that of other creditors.
At the same time, the participation of the RFAs and
other creditors in joint programs allows the IMF’s
financial contribution to be smaller than it would
be otherwise, which limits the pain involved in
respecting the preferred position of the Fund.
To conclude, member states and other creditors
should respect and uphold the preferred creditor
status of the IMF. If ever the occasion permits,
this status should be formalized in the Fund’s
Articles of Agreement. The RFAs should have
status that, while subordinate to the Fund, is
senior to other creditors, as the ESM has asserted.
We should guard against the possibility that one
member state or another will assert status for its
RFA that is senior to that of the Fund when and
if its regional arrangement is developed further.

Transparency
The IMF has become progressively more
transparent over the last two decades and has
outpaced most of the other institutions in this
respect. While the ESM is relatively advanced
in terms of transparency, other RFAs operate
largely confidentially. ASEAN+3 authorities, for
example, have published summaries of the CMIM
Agreement, but they have never published the
agreement itself. 74 The discrepancy is likely to be
problematic in cases of co-financing with the IMF
at a couple of different levels. It can give rise to
transparency arbitrage, driving some functions or
decisions toward the least transparent institution
in the institutional team. It can impede the sharing
of crucial information among institutions. And
the discrepancy can impinge on communication
when, for example, two institutions are called
upon to explain a joint program at the rollout press
conference. The practice of the most transparent
institution, not the least transparent, should set
the standard for cooperation between them.
Improvements in transparency would be vital
if and when RFAs tool up for a broader range
of activities, including program design and
policy conditionality. They cannot be overseeing
adjustment programs, which will be controversial
domestically, without being at least as forthcoming
about their analysis and rationales as the IMF.
Failure to advance along this dimension would
weaken their credibility in financial markets and
their political standing within their member
states. Reliance on informal approaches to
dispute resolution renders transparency all the
more important. Although it has been made
before, the point is worth stressing because
transparency is not included in either the G20 or
the IMF principles for institutional collaboration.

74 Central bank swap arrangements also vary considerably in their level
of transparency. The US Federal Reserve posts the text of its swap
agreements on its website and drawings are recorded in statistical
releases weekly. See, for example, US Federal Reserve (2010). The
People’s Bank of China, on the other hand, posts relatively little.
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Conclusion
This report reviews several of the important
conceptual and policy issues surrounding RFAs
and their relationships to the IMF, as global
financial governance becomes more complex.
Specifically, it assesses the benefits and pitfalls of
having multiple, overlapping institutions involved
in crisis finance. Three RFAs are examined in
depth: FLAR, the ASEAN+3 institutions and the
ESM — a group that presents the range of issues
that can arise. The analysis stresses the normative
distinction between designing institutions
for functional purposes versus the politicalinstitutional imperatives of the member states
that create them. Notwithstanding the vision of
many architects for more efficient institutional
coordination, member states’ insistence on control
over outcomes limits what can be achieved in
advance of crises. Rather than being organized
ex ante, therefore, institutional coordination will
largely be mediated by key member states ex post.
The previous section detailed the study’s findings
with respect to the dangers of institutional
overlap, four of which are highlighted here. First,
while harmful in some areas, such as program
conditionality, institutional competition can
be beneficial in other areas, such as economic
analysis, forecasting and surveillance. Second,
while it pervades crisis rescues, the threat of
moral hazard varies substantially across regional
arrangements and is critically dependent on
institutional governance. Accordingly, moral
hazard will vary as regions’ influence within the
IMF evolves over time with reallocation of voting
shares. Third, while the staffs of these institutions
should have autonomy in the technical analysis
underpinning surveillance and lending programs,
program approval should remain the province of
boards with political responsibility. Among other
things, such a division of responsibility protects
the mediating role of key principals in resolving
disputes among institutions informally. Finally, the
report defends the preferred creditor status of the
IMF and calls on RFAs to, at a minimum, match
the (generally greater) transparency of the Fund.
Owing to the global reach of financial markets and
economies of scope and agglomeration in economic
surveillance, analysis and program design, the IMF
has traditionally been at the centre of the GFSN. The
link, which is present as either a formal or de facto

matter in most RFAs, is one principal manifestation
of the Fund’s central position — the glue that
coheres the safety net. While RFAs or even central
bank swap agreements conduct modest-sized or
short-term operations, therefore, crises in countries
that require prolonged adjustment and large loans
remain the province of programs that involve
the IMF. Europe can, in principle, design and
implement adjustment programs independently,
but for a number of political and institutional
reasons has not made a clean break from the Fund.
Historically, discourse over the development of
RFAs surrounds the question of whether they
weaken the centrality of the IMF or the collective
discipline of the safety net when delivering
assistance. But, rather than develop one at the
expense of the other, this report recommends that
both the RFAs and the IMF be developed further.
As a general matter, after all, the resources for
economic policy surveillance, crisis prevention and
post-crisis financial stabilization remain chronically
undersupplied in global financial governance.
However, the approach to crisis fighting in
which the IMF is central is under threat from a
different quarter: nationalism in the countries on
whose support the IMF has been most reliant.
Those countries include the two that were
principally responsible for creating the Bretton
Woods institutions, the United States and the
United Kingdom, and extend to several other
European and large emerging-market countries.
Such nationalism threatens to deny the IMF
and other institutions adequate resources and
block the provision of financial assistance.
Under such circumstances, the development
of RFAs and other financial facilities provides
insurance against the possibility that the IMF
might become unavailable in a crisis. Development
of RFAs is desirable for this reason, among
others. But architects of governance must
recognize that nationalism can redound against
regional institutions as well. So, the reverse
could also apply: the IMF can provide insurance
against immobilization of regional finance. By
creating alternative institutional pathways for
financial assistance, in other words, greater
institutional overlap and complexity helps to
avoid monopolization and weakens the chokehold
of narrowly self-serving nationalist leaders.
Designing global financial governance in this way
requires protecting the ability of the RFAs to act
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independently if the IMF were to be immobilized.
But it also requires maintaining the ability of
regional institutions to cooperate with the
IMF in the hope and expectation that the Fund
continues to receive support from its principal
stakeholders and deserves its central place in
the regime complex for crisis finance. By these
strategies, architects of governance can build
both coherence and resilience into the GFSN.
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